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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
I. TOOLEY v. MARTIN-MARIETTA CORP.: A POSITIVE 
STEP FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN EMPLOYMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,1 the Ninth Circuit held 
(1) a substitute charity payment, in lieu of union dues, is a rea-
sonable method of accommodating the plaintiffs' religious objec-
tions to the payment of union dues under section 701(j) of the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1964,· and (2) the accommodation require-
ment did not· contravene the first amendment's prohibition 
against the establishment of religion.' 
The plaintiffs were discharged for refusing to pay union 
dues in· violation of a collective bargaining agreement executed 
in 1976.· The plaintiffs refused to join the union or pay union 
dues because such payment conflicted with their religious be-
liefs,' and offered instead to pay an amount equivalent to union 
dues to charity-an offer the union refused.' They sought relief 
against the company and the union under Title VII of the Civil 
1. 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Farris, J.; the other panel members were Hug 
and Tang, J.J.), cert. denied. 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1981). 
2. [d. at 1243. Section 701(j) of.the Civil Rights Act provides: "The term 'religion' 
includes all aspecte of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an em-
ployer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or 
prospective employee's religious observance or practice without due hardship on the con-
duct of the employer's businesa." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976). 
3. 648 F.2d at 1246. The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion ..•. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
4. 648 F.2d at 1241. The parties executed the contract pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 158 
(a)(3)(1976), which provides in part: 
(3) .•. Provided, That nothing in this subchapter or in 
any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an em-
ployer from making an agreement with a labor organization 
• • • to require as a condition of employment membership 
therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of 
such employment or the effective date of such· agreement, 
whichever is later .... 
5. 648 F.2d at 1241. 
6. [d. 
25 
1
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Rights Act of 1964.7 
The union's claim that the loss of revenue due to plaintiffs' 
non-payment imposed an undue hardship on the union' was re-
jected by the district court.' The district court issued an injunc-
tion prohibiting the plaintiffs' discharge.1o The court also or-
dered the plaintiffs to pay to charity an amount equal to union 
dues.ll 
The union appealed on two grounds: (1) the decision was 
clearly erroneous because the court mistakenly found no undue 
hardship and (2) section 701(j) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as 
applied was unconstitutional under the establishment clause of 
the first amendment. The Ninth Circuit unanimously rejected 
7. Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of § 703(a) and 703(c). Section 
703(a) provides in relevant part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
(1) • . . to discharge any individual • . . because of such 
individual's ... religion •.. or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or claaaify his employees ..• in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such Individual's ... religion 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). 
Section 703(c) of the Act provides in relevant part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor 
organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or other-
wise to discriminate against, any individual because of his ... 
religion .•. 
(2) to limit, segregate, or cIauify Ita memberahip ... , or 
classify ... any individual, in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual or ... employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his statUi as an employee .•. 
because of such individual's ... religion •.. or 
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discrimi-
nate against an individual in violation of this section. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976). 
8. 64S F.2d at 1243. 
9. The district court found that: (1) the lou of dues attributable to plaintiff's non-
payment was approximately $600 per y~, (2) there was a lubstantial likelihood that 
three other employees would request similar accommodation increasing the loes to $1,200 
per year, (3) the union's 1978 income WBI $46,000-$4,300 more than expenses and (4) 
there were sizeable budget surpluses since 1976 even though the union donated to char-
ity. 476 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (D. Or. 1979). 
10. 648 F.2d at 1241. 
11.Id. 
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both contentions and affirmed the district court decision by 
holding the union did not demonstrate undue hardship and that 
the requirement of accommodation does not violate the estab-
lishment clause when the government maintains a position of 
neutrality and is not excessively involved in religious matters. II 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Statutory Challenge 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act)18 was 
designed to prohibit employment discrimination.14 In 1976, Con-
gress amended the Act, focusing on discrimination based on re-
ligion.11I Religious discrimination, unlike other types of invidious 
discrimination, is especially problematic because of two conflict-
ing policies, both of which command national approval. III First, 
employment discrimination based on invidious criteria is prohib-
ited. I ' Second, the harmonious relationships between business 
and labor, using the vehicle of the union shop, must be 
promoted.18 
However, business and labor must not discriminate against 
12. 1d. at 1243, 1246. 
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (1976). 
14. 110 CONGo REc. 1521, 1528-29 (1964). 
15. Section 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976). See 118 CONGo REc. 705, 706 (1972) 
(remarks of Mr. Randolph). For the text of § 701(j), see note 2 supra. The amendment to 
the Civil Rights Act that later became § 701(j) was approved unanimously. 118 CONGo 
RBC. 731 (1972). 
16. 648 F.2d at 1242; Anderson v General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 
F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979). 
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(c) (1976). For the text of these sections, see 
note 7 supra. See also Nottelson v Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806,643 F.2d 445, 
450 (7th Cir. 1981) (Title VII is an exception to NLRA union security clauses), cert. 
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981); McDaniel v Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 
338, 343 (6th Cir. 1978) ("Since July 2, 1964 ... , there has been no national policy of 
higher priority than the elmination of discrimination in employment practices."). 
18. Courts that have stre88ed the importance of the union shop have been concerned 
about the possibility of free riders. See Nottelson V. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 
19806, 643 F.2d 445, 456 (7th Cir. 1981) (pell, J., dissenting) (notwithstanding the plain-
tiff's payment to charity, he is still a free rider via-a-vis the union), cert. denied, 50 
U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981); Gray V. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 429 F.2d 1064, 
1072 (5th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff was never asked to embrace the doctrine of unionism but 
merely to pay his fair share), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971); Linscott V. Miller Falls 
Co., 440 F.2d 14, 18 (let Cir.) (industrial peace is objective of union shop), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 872 (1971); Linscott V. Miller Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (D. M888. 1970) 
(p088ibility of free riders will seriously disrupt commerce). 
3
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an employee and/or member on the basis of religion.1i Thus, the 
conflict between the national policies of promoting the union 
shop and ameliorating employment discrimination intensifies 
when an individual fails to conform to a business practice or join 
or support a labor union because of his or her religious beliefs.lo 
Congress has attempted to reconcile this conflict through 
section 701(j) of the Actll which imposes a duty on the employer 
to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs unless it results 
in undue hardship. The Ninth Circuit applied the duty of ac-
commodation to unions in Yott v. North American Rockwell 
Corp. (Yott //).11 Several other circuits have followed suit. II 
Most of the problems concerning accommodation have 
arisen in two factual contexts: (1) a religious employee refuses to 
work on the Sabbath, or on religious holidays which do not con-
form to mainstream religious sabbaths and holidays," or (2) a 
religious employee refuses to join or support a union or other 
business practice. III Although all courts recognize the employer's 
duty to accommodate the religious beliefs of his em-
ployee-aside from the constitutional objections that a few 
courts have raisedlS-the courts are divided as to what consti-
19. Sections 703(a) and (c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(c) (1976). For the rele-
vant text of these sections, see note 7 supra. 
20. See cases cited notes 24-25 infra and accompanying text. 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976). For the text of § 2000e(j), S88 note 2 supra. 
22. 602 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980). The plaintiff 
in Yott II argued that § 701(j) did not maridate consideration of hardship to the union. 
The court held that since neither the employer nor the union can discriminate against an 
employee, it is not unreasonable to consider the burden on the union. Id. 
23. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. la, 1981); Cooper v. General Dynamics, 
Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163, 170 (5th Cir.) (Brown, C.J., concurring) (both 
union and employer have a duty of accommodation and thus the union may show hard-
ship as well), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1976). 
24. See, e.g., Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806 643 F.2d 445 (7th 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981); Yott II, 602 F.2d 904 (9th 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 445 U.S. 928 (1980); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair 
Aerospace Div .• 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Burns v. 
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 
(1979); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp. (Yott I), 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974). 
25. See, e.g., Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C .• Inc., 595 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1979); Chrysler 
Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1977); Huston v. 
Local 93. Int'l Union. 559 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1977); Draper v. United States Pipe & 
Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975). 
26. See cases cited note 84 infra and accompanying text. 
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tutes reasonable accommodation.I '7 
The trend in the circuit courts has been to construe broadly 
the employer's duty to accommodate" and one circuit has stated 
that Title VII is an exception to the national policy of union 
security clauses. Ii This trend is gaining momentum despite the 
Supreme Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Har-
dison,lo which narrowly construed the employer's duty to accom-
modate.sl The Hardison Court held that the employer was not 
required to violate the seniority clause in a collective bargaining 
agreement in order to accommodate the religious needs of a Sab-
batarianSII and that any cost of the accommodation in excess of a 
de minimis amount constitutes undue hardship." 
Notwithstanding the Hardison decision, the Ninth Circuit 
has favored a broad interpretation of the 'employer's and union's 
duty to accommodate the religious needs of their respective em-
ployees and members.se The Ninth Circuit has considered four 
cases nearly identical factually to Tooley. In Yott v. North 
American Rockwell Corp. (Yott 1),111 the plaintiff was discharged 
for failing to pay union dues because of his religious beliefs." 
The defendant offered to allow him to pay an equivalent amount 
27. Compare Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1979) (defen-
dant does not have to bend over backwards to accommodate the plaintiff' but rather work 
within the seniority system) and Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir.) 
(employee also has a burden of accommodation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1977) with 
Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 1979) (defendant must point 
to some actual additional cost to establish undue hardship) and Draper v. United States 
Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 519 (6th Cir. 1975) (defendant must first attempt to 
accommodate the employee within his own classification and transfer him only as a last 
resort). See generally Note, California's Controls on Employer Abuse of Employee Po-
litical Rights, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1015, 1033 (1975). 
28. See cases cited note 17 supra. 
29. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981). 
30. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
31. [d. at 84. 
32 A sabbatarian is an individual who reserves one day a week for exclusively reli-
gious activities. 
33. 432 U.S. at 84. 
34. See Yott II, 602 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980); 
Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1072 (1979); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 
402 (9th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Yott I, 501 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
35. 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974). 
36. Id. at 400. 
5
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to a charity of his choice. S7 The plaintiff refused, claiming that 
one of his religious tenets prohibited forced contributions to an-
yone, even his own church.88 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
judgment for the defendants, using a balancing test to weigh the 
societal interests in labor peace and free flow of interstate com-
merce against the individual's interest in first amendment 
rights.89 The court concluded that the balance fell in defendant's 
favor because of a strong congressional policy against permitting 
free riders to share in the benefits of unionism without paying 
the cost, whereas the cost to the individual is merely finding 
non-union shop work which is generally less remunerative!O 
In the next case involving non-payment of union dues for 
religious reasons, Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aero-
space Division,fl the Ninth Circuit first recognized the conflict 
between union security agreements and Title VII accommoda-
tion." It then set out the burden to be borne by each party with 
respect to accommodation.4s The plaintiff must show a bona fide 
belief that union membership and the payment of dues violate 
his religious faith, that he informed both the employer and the 
union of the conflict with the collective bargaining agreement, 
and that he was discharged for failure to join the union and 
tender dues." The burden then shifts to the defendant to show 
a good faith effort to accommodate plaintiff's religious beliefs or 
demonstrate that it was unable to reasonably accommodate the 
plaintiff's beliefs without undue hardship." 
In Burns v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,'- the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the union's claim of undue hardship 
which was based on the loss of dues attributable to plaintiff's 
37.Id. 
38.Id 
39. Id. at 403. 
40. Id. at 404. 
41. 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979). 
42. Id. at 400. The district court in Anderson held that the burden of going forward 
with respect to accommodation was not borne by either party. The only relevant ques-
tion was whether an accommodation could be reached. 430 F. Supp. 418, 421 (S.D. Cal. 
1977). The district court found that the plaintiff refused to pay union dues because he 
distrusted the union, not because of his religious beliefs. Id. at 422. 
43. 589 F.2d at 401. 
44.Id. 
45. Id. at 402. 
46. 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). 
6
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non-payment." The court also reaffirmed its view in Anderson 
by stating that dissatisfaction among fellow employees did not 
by itself establish undue hardship. The court required actual 
disruption of the work routine.48 The court also rejected the 
union's claim that granting this substitution would open the 
door to more requests for substitution, resulting in a greater 
than de minimis burden," as hypothetical or speculative, hence 
inadeq~ate to satisfy the requirement of undue hardship. 50 
Finally, in Yott II,II the Ninth Circuit decided on statutory 
grounds that the employer had made a reasonable attempt at 
accommodation and that all the plaintiff's proposals would have 
resulted in undue hardship." The court, however, did not reach 
the constitutional issue.1II 
The other "circuits and the Supreme Court vary widely in 
their views of what constitutes "reasonable accommodation" and 
"undue hardship."M One concern of the courts that narrowly 
47. Id. at 404-05. 
48. Id. at 406-07. The union's hardship case was based on suppositions that free 
riden would cause serious dissension resulting in inefficiency of operation. Id. 
49. Id. at 407. 
5O.ld. 
51. 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980). 
52. Id. at 907. 
53. The district court in Yott 11 held that § 701(j) unconstitutionally violated the 
tint amendment's proscription of an establishment of religion. 428 F. Supp. 763, 767 
(C.D. Cal. 1977). The court reasoned that religious objections are accorded a preference 
not given to political or moral objections, and stated that the government must be neu-
tral in religious matten, even if it results in sacrifice to the individual. Id. 
54. The circuits which have narrowly construed § 701(j) have taken several ap-
proaches. Fint, they seem to stress the severe, adverse impact of allowing exceptions to 
union shop clauses even if the clause burdens the plaintifl"s right to the free exercise of 
religion. See cases cited note 18 supra. See also Linscott v. Miller Falla Co., 316 F. Supp. 
1369, 1372 (D. Mass. 1970) (requirement to pay dues did burden plaintifl"s right to free 
exercise of religion but the burden was justified by the compelling governmental "interest 
of promoting labor peace). But cf. Note, Accommodation of an Employee's Religious 
Practices Under Title V11, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 867, 885-86 (1976) (a seniority system is not 
a sufficiently compelling interest to overcome religious liberty). The courts fear that ex-
ceptions will swallow the rule and defeat the purposes of the National Labor Relations 
Act. Ct. Bums v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978) (if excusing 
the plaintiff opens a floodgate of dues avoiders so that the union's fiscal integrity is at 
stake, there need be no accommodation), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). 
Specifically, these courts are concerned about the possibility of free riden-those 
who get the benefit of unionism without paying a fair share of the cost-resulting from 
bogus claims of religion. These are justifiable concerns, given the court's extreme reluc-
tance to ever inquire into the validity of one's religion. "It is no business of courts to say 
... what is a religious practice or activity ... :' Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 
7
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construe the accommodation requirement is that social legisla-
tion which benefits all members of society should not be invali-
dated because of the religious preferences of a few.611 The Eighth 
Circuit, in Chrysler Corp. v. Mann,r's expressed concern that be-
cause the statute requires the employer, not the employee, to do 
the accommodating, the employee might be intransigent and 
force the employer to capitulate to his demands.1I7 Consequently, 
that court held the employee must at least cooperate with at-
tempts at reasonable accommodation, and the employee cannot 
shirk all responsibility to the employer,l'8 Most courts hold that 
if a religious precept does not permit any accommodation on its 
face, the employee may be legally discharged.e• 
The circuits that have supported a broad reading of section 
701(j) have also struggled with the concept of reasonable accom-
modation and undue hardship. These two concepts interrelate in 
that an employer must accommodate the employee's beliefs up 
to the point where undue hardship to the employer exists. Ac-
commodations are unreasonable if the employer stops short of 
that point.so Thus the critical inquiry is: At what point does un-
due hardship exist? One court assumed that any accommodation 
900 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953». Religion can 
be arbitrary, irrational, inconsistent, and eccentric and still merit protection under the 
first amendment. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 
1430 (1981). Furthermore, a believer need not be consistent in his behavior or may act on 
some tenet, in the name of religious freedom, that is not universally held by the church 
to which the individual belongs. ld. 
55. See Gray v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 429 F.2d 1064, 1072 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971). Although general policy often contradicts specific religious 
belief, "it is not possible in an ordered society to allow every aspect of religious belief to 
stay the hand of government under the aegis of the First Amendment." ld. 
56. 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977). 
57. ld. at 1285. 
58.ld. 
59. The courts have generally recognized a narrow exception to the duty of accom-
modation when the religious tenet is 80 unconventional that there is no foreseeable 
method of accommodation. E.g., You II, 602 F.2d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1979) (employee's 
religious tenet which prevented any compulsory contribution to charity so that the sub-
stitute charity accommodation would not work, justified employee's discharge), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 
1970) (employee who not only refused to work on his Sabbath but refused to have any-
one substitute for him believing that he was encouraging others to sin, was properly 
discharged), af/'d by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). See Draper v. United 
States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975) (possible to prove undue 
hardship without actually attempting to accommodate). 
60. See text accompanying notes 63-68 infra. 
8
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would entail some hardship, but concluded that not all hardship 
is undue.61 According to the Ninth Circuit in Anderson, 
"[u]ndue hardship means something greater than hardship."61 
Recognizing the lack of standards to judge the point at 
which hardship becomes undue, courts have attempted to give 
these words meaning through positive and negative examples. 
For example, no undue hardship exists when the union is de-
prived of an individual's dues"a when other employees grumble 
and complain about favoritism,64 or when the union incurs a 
small administrative cost.'11 Undue hardship does exist when the 
union incurs a greater than de minimis cost," the proposed ac-
commodation compromises the safety of all employees,6? or the 
proposed accommodation violates a bona fide collective bargain-
ing agreement." The Supreme Court, in Hardison, settled the 
question of undue hardship by defining the undue hardship 
standard as any cost in excess of a de minimis amount.69 
61. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975). 
62. 589 F.2d at 402. 
63. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981). 
64. Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397,402 (9th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 
F.2d 403, 406-07 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). 
65. Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d at 1246. 
66. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
67. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d SIS, 521 (6th Cir. 1975). 
68. Id. Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1979); Chrysler Corp. 
v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1039 (1977); Huston v. 
Local 93, Int'l. Union, 559 F.2d 477, 480 (8th Cir. 1977). 
69. 432 U.S. at 84. The Court accepted the district court's express findings that any 
of Hardison's proposed accommodations would have resulted in undue hardship. [d. at 
83 n,14. 
The Hardison dissent denounced the majority's reasoning and conclusion. First, the 
dissent attacked the majority's condemnation of unequal treatment, stating that accom-
modation, to any significant degree, involves inherently unequal treatment. Thus, to con-
demn unequal treatment is tantamount to emasculating the statute. [d. at 87. Second, 
the dissenters disagreed with the Court's formulation and application of the undue hard-
ship standard. The dissent stated that to equate undue hardship to anything more than 
de minimis cost was to stretch the English language beyond recognition. [d. at 93 n.6. 
Furthermore, they argued, even if the majority correctly formulated the standard, it was 
incorrectly applied. Id. at 92. The district court found that $150 for three months consti-
tuted an undue hardship on the defendant's business. [d. at 92 n.6. This extra cost 
amounted to only a de minimis burden on the employer. [d. The dissent did not accord 
great weight to the district court's finding because there was nothing in the record to 
suggest that the district court properly interpreted and applied the term undue hard-
ship. [d. 
9
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The Constitutional Challenge 
One of the more controversial aspects of the duty of accom-
modation is whether it unconstitutionally establishes a religion. 
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof .... "70 This seemingly simple statement has 
generated volumes of litigation as to what Congress and the 
states can do with respect to regulating or accommodating reli-
gious beliefs.71 The Supreme Court has often been called upon 
to resolve conflicts between the free exercise and establishment 
clauses.7lI The court has noted a general harmony between the 
two clauses, although the free exercise clause has a reach of its 
own.78 However, the Court has also pointed out that either 
70. u.s. CONST. amend. I. 
71. Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.J. Super. 63, 68, 274 A.2d 832, 
837 (1971). 
Because the courts have left many questions in this area unanswered, commentators 
have assumed widely varying positions in determining standards for the scope of both 
clauses. See Clark, Guidelines lor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REV. 327, 331 
(1969) (importance of a law should be measured by incremental benefit of applying it to 
religious objectors); Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on Grounds 01 Religion and 
Conscience, 62 Ky. L.J. 377, 392 (1974) (tendency of courts is to exalt free exercise clause 
over establishment clause); Note, supra note 54, at 875 (the privilege of inaction should 
be protected against state intrusion while religious action can be regulated). One com-
mentator gave greater weight to the establishment clause and reasoned that the state 
may not prefer one person over another in any way on the basis of religion. Shetreet, 
supra. Another commentator gave greater weight to the free exercise clause by reasoning 
that the state may not interfere with religion absent a compelling state interest, and then 
only if it pursues the route least restrictive of religious liberty. Note, supra note 54. 
72. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) (inevitable 
tension exists between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause and it may 
often not be possible to promote the former without violating the latter); see, e.g., Abing-
ton v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1960); Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 310 U.s. 296 (1939). 
73. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971). One example of the reach of 
the free exercise clause is Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The majority there 
found no conflict with the establishment clause because: (1) paying benefits to sabbatari-
ans was a neutral government act; (2) there was no excessive involvement; (3) the law did 
not abridge any other person's religious liberty. Id. at 409. 
Justice Stewart's concurrence interpreted the free exercise clause most liberally stat-
ing that the Constitution commands positive protection of religious freedom by the gov-
ernment. [d. at 416. He described the Court's decillions interpreting the establishment 
clause as "positively wooden" and contrary to the intent of the clause. Id. at 414. Justice 
Stewart stated that he would not find an establishment clause violation unless the gov-
ernment tended to exalt one sect over another. A law that benefits all religions equally 
would be constitutional. Id. at 416. 
In his dissent, Justice Harlan took precisely the opposite view. He acknowledged 
that "the Constitutional path of neutrality is not so narrow a channel that the slightest 
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clause taken to an extreme would clash with the other and thus 
has recognized that it must balance both clauses and attempt to 
strike a middle course that neither respects an establishment of 
religion nor prohibits its free exercise." In Wisconsin v. Yoder," 
the Supreme Court stated that because religious freedom is 
highly valued in the constitution, the strict scrutiny standard of 
review applies whenever a law burdens its free exercise.'1' 
deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to condemnation." Id. at 422. He 
stated, however, that the free exercise clause does not compel a state to provide exemp-
tions for religious objectors but merely permits it. Id. 
74. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973). 
75. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
76. Id. at 233. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 206(1) (1956): "Under the consti-
tutions, freedom of religion is in a preferred position, and in balancing the constitutional 
rights of property owners against those of the people to enjoy freedom of religion, the 
latter occupy a preferred position." 
Although a free exercise claim was not raised in Tooley, the standards used to evalu-
ate this claim are very instructive because both a free exercise claim and a request for 
accommodation are analytically similar, in that both are based on a claim of exemption 
from a generally applicable state law. 
Some commentators have suggested an action/inaction dichotomy to divide pro-
tected from unprotected religious practices. Clark, supra note 71, at 346; Shetreet, supra 
note 71, at 413; Note, supra note 54, at 875. Religious action may not be protected if it 
runs counter to the public policy of a state or violates a health, safety, or criminal law. 
See generally Clark, supra note 71, at 340-50. The courts have condemned polygamy, 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), and the use of illicit drugs in religious 
ceremonies, Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rell'd on other grounds, 
395 U.S. 6 (1969). This is consistent with the principle that religious believers have an 
absolute freedom to believe, but only a qualified freedom to act, subject to the state's 
interest in promoting the welfare of its citizens. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 
303-04 (1939); Cap Santa Vue v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
Religious inaction exists when the religious individual seeks. an exemption from a 
generally applicable state law. See generally Clark, supra note 71, at 345-47. One should 
not, however, interpret the dichotomy to mean that claims of exemption must always be 
honored. The dividing line in exemption claims is crossed if the exemption of a few indi-
viduals will defeat the purpose of the statute or endanger other individuals. Thus one 
court has stated that general innoculation schemes to prevent the spread of disease over-
come a religious person's objections. Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 
S;W.2d 644 (1965). Although most courts have held that an individual employee may be 
exempt from a union security clause, an employer may not refuse to bargain with a union 
on the basis of a religious objection. Cap Santa Vue v. NLRB, 424 F.2d at 889-91. 
The Supreme Court has Interpreted the free exercise clause not only to permit (or 
require) exemptions, but also to prohibit the withholding of state granted benefits if the 
free exercise of religion is thereby burdened. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), 
the Supreme Court held that former employees could not be denied state employment 
benefits because the plainti1f refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. Id. at 404. The 
Court reasoned that to require the plaintiff to make herself available for Saturday work, 
the state was forcing her to choose between her religion and her benefits. Id. Imposing 
such a burden on the religious individual was tantamount to fining her for Saturday 
worship. ld. 
The Supreme Court in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 101 S. 
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The trend in religion cases is toward a more generous treat-
ment of religious freedom.'7'7 An early Supreme Court case stated 
that the separation of church and state must be complete and 
unequivocal and permit no exceptions.'78 Later, the Court re-
treated from this absolutist view of the first amendment, reason-
ing that it has never been thought desirable to enforce a regime 
of total separation '79 and that the correct position of government 
vis-a-vis religion is benevolent neutrality-neither sponsorship 
nor interference. so The Court has summed up its position thus: 
"The general principle deductible from the First Amendment 
and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not 
tolerate either governmentally established religion or govern-
mental interference with religion. "sl 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,8!J the Court established a test to de-
Ct. 1425 (1981), recently affirmed the Sherbert holding. There, the plaintiff, a Jehovah's 
Witness, quit his job because he refused to work on any assembly line that directly pro-
duced articles of war. Id. at 1428. The defendant board denied the plaintiff unemploy-
ment benefits because the state law only allowed payment of such benefits if the plaintiff 
was terminated for good cause. Id. at 1429. The defendant also argued that other Jeho-
vah's Witnesses had worked producing gun turrets and thus the plaintiff's refusal to 
produce them was not a religious objection but a personal one. Id. at 1428. 
The Supreme Court held that putting substantial pressure on a religious adherent to 
modify his behavior created a burden upon religion. Id. at 1432. The Court dismissed the 
defendant's contention that the plaintiff's belief was a personal one. A belief need not be 
held by all members of a particular religion to qualify as religious. Id. at 1430. In any 
case, it was certainly not the business of the Court to judge the validity of religious 
beliefs. 
77. See Shetreet, supra note 71, at 399. 
78. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). 
79. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973). 
SO. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.s. 664, 669 (1970). 
81. Id. It is critical to remember that the Supreme Court conaiders atheism and 
agnosticism to be religions within the purview of the first amendment. See Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968): 
[Government] may not be hostile to any religion or to the ad-
vocacy of no religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote 
one religion or religious theory against another or even against 
the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates gov-
ernmental neutrality between religion and religion, and be-
tween religion and non-religion. 
Id. at 104 (footnote omitted). See also Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 
F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975). Thus a law that benefits all religions-as the term is commonly 
understood-may stiII violate the establishment clause because the religious is preferred 
over the secular (atheist). Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,771 (1973) 
(a law need not establish a religion to be unconstitutional, it merely needs to respect an 
establishment of religion. A benefit to all religions may respect the establishment of 
them.). 
82. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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termine the constitutionality of a law challenged as an establish-
ment of religion. According to Lemon, a law must (1) have a sec-
ular legislative purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not involve excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion. B8 . 
Several courts have challenged the constitutionality of sec-
tion 701(j)." Because there is no direct guidance from the Su-
preme COurtBD as to the constitutionality of section 701(j), one 
must look to the test articulated in both L~mon and Committee 
for Public Education v. Nyquist. B6 Most courts have applied 
these tests to section 701(j) and concluded that the statute is 
constitutional.B7 However, other courts, taking guidance from 
the Supreme Court's narrower decisions, have come to the oppo-
site conclusion.88 
First, some courts have attacked the statute on the basis 
that it lacks a secular legislative purpose.a. They claim that al-
though prohibiting religious discrimination is a secular purpose, 
the statute goes beyond that by requiring that employers not 
only avoid discriminating against a religious employee, but actu-
ally accommodate the employee's religious beliefs." The courts 
have refused to equate the duty not to discriminate with the af-
firmative duty to accommodate.'l By requiring the employer to 
accommodate an employee's religious beliefs, the statute has es-
tablished a preference for the religious over the secular, and thus 
has departed from the constitutional path of neutrality.'· 
Second, a minority of courts have argued that the primary 
83. [d. at 612·13. 
84. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1970) (accommo· 
dation requirement raised grave constitutional questions); Yott II, 428 F. Supp. 763 
(C.D. Cal. 1977). 
85. When the constitutional challenge was raised in Hardison, the Supreme Court 
avoided it by narrowing the scope or the statute. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 
U.S. 63, 89 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
86. 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973). 
87. See text accompanying note 83 supra, and notes 96·104 infra and accompanying 
text, and cases cited therein. 
88. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 335 (6th Cir. 1970); Yott II, 428 F. 
Supp. 763, 766 (C.D. Cal. 1977) . 
. 89. See. e.g .• Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co .• 429 F.2d 324. 335 (6th Cir. 1970). 
90. [d. 
91. [d. 
92. Yott II. 428 F. Supp. 763. 767 (C.D. Cal. 1977). 
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effect of the statute is to advance religion.911 One court reasoned 
that workers with strong political, social or moral objections to 
unions are still compelled to pay union dues and to work when 
assigned.94 Thus, the strength of one's convictions is irrelevant. 
The exemption from certain obligations depends on that convic-
tion being categorized as religious. Non-religious objectors are 
still forced to choose between their beliefs and their jobs. Conse-
quently, religious objections are protected while others, equally 
strong, are not. 
The majority of the courts which consider section 701 (j) 
constitutional apply a different analysis to the three-prong 
Lemon-Nyquist test.911 First, the majority of courts hold that 
prohibiting religious employment discrimination is a sufficiently 
secular legislative purpose." The requirement of accommodation 
is one means of realizing the goal of non-discrimination." This 
requirement also affords extra protection to religious free-
dom-a value of admittedly high social importance.98 That this 
requirement results in unequal treatment of employees does not 
render the statute unconstitutional.99 As one court pointed out, 
if no unequal treatment were allowed, the requirement of ac-
commodation would be a nullity and might conflict with the free 
exercise clause.loo 
The second prong of the Lemon-Nyquist test-that the 
law's primary effect must not advance religion-is also fulfilled 
by section 701(j). The primary purpose of the statute is to oblit-
erate the necessity of an employee choosing between his job and 
93. See, e.g., Yott II, 428 F. Supp. 763, 767 (C.D. Cal. 1977). 
94. [d. at 766. 
95. The Lemon-Nyquist test is set out in text accompanying note 83 supra. 
96. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90-91 n.4 (1977) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806,643 F.2d 445,454-55, cert. 
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F. 
Supp. 1027, 1030 (D. Or. 1979); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 70, 
271 n.47 (1977). 
97. See cases and material cited note 96 supra. 
98. See note 76 supra. 
99. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 1979). If no dift'eren-
tial treatment were permitted, it "would preclude all forms of accommodation and defeat 
the very purpose behind [section 701(j»." [d. 
100. [d. Although the free exercise clause does not mandate accommodation in the 
statutory sense, the strict scrutiny standard still demands that the least restrictive 
means of fulfilling a compelling state interest be used. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. 
Employment Sec. Div., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1432 (1981). 
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his religion except when the nature of the job mandates certain 
activities contrary to the employee's religious scruples. The pri-
mary benefit of this statute inures to the individual employee 
and not to a particular religion. That the religion may receive 
incidental or tertiary benefits from an accommodation does not 
render the statute unconstitutional.lol 
Finally, the majority of the courts argue that the accommo-
dation requirement does not require excessive governmental en-
tanglement with religion. 1011 There is nothing intrinsically com-
plicated about the accommodation requirement that requires the 
courts' constant surveillance. loa Once a court finds that accom-
modation is required, its task is over.l04 
C. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., the Ninth Circuit up-
held an injunction preventing the defendants (employer and 
union) from discharging the plaintiffs for failure to pay union 
dues, provided they paid an equivalent amount to charity. 1011 
First, the court established that religious discrimination is pro-
hibited by sections 703(a) and 703(c) of the Act,toe Then, it 
quoted section 701(j) of the Act as requiring reasonable accom-
modation unless the employer can show undue hardship.lo7 It 
also held that the union was subject to the duty of accommoda-
tion Under section 701(j) even though the statute is framed in 
terms of the employer's duty,to8 
101. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973). 
102. See cases cited note 96 supra. 
103. See cases cited note 96 supra. 
104. See cases cited note 96 supra. 
105. 648 F.2d at 1241. 
106 ld. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(c) (1976). For text of these sections, see 
note 7 supra. 
107. 648 F.2d at 1241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976). For text of this section, see note 2 
supra. 
108. 648 F.2d at 1241. This application is not unreasonable considering that unions 
are also prohibited from engaging in employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) 
(1976). The Ninth Circuit, in Yott 11,602 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 928 (1980), applied the accommodation requirement and the hardship limitation to 
unions. The Sixth Circuit, in Cooper v. General Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., 533 
F.2d 163, 169-70 (5th Cir.) (Brown, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1976), 
stated that both union and employer have a duty of accommodation but the statute is 
confined to hardship on the employer's business. See also notes 22-23 supra and cases 
cited therein. 
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Defendants first argued that plaintiff's request to pay an 
equivalent amount to charity in lieu of union dues was inher-
ently unreasonable. The defendants urged that allowing this 
type of accommodation would clash with the congressional pol-
icy of promoting union shop agreements.108 The court answered 
that preventing employment discrimination is an equally impor-
tant congressional policy. Section 701(j) represents Congress' at-
tempt to balance both interests through the medium of reasona-
ble accommodation. The court also drew support for its finding 
that the accommodation was reasonable from the' recent amend-
ment to section 19 of the National Labor Relations Act which 
permits substitute payments if agreed to by the parties in their 
collective bargaining agreement. no The court then concluded 
that the requested accommodation was reasonable because the 
defendant enjoyed the benefits of a union shop agreement while 
the plaintiffs kept their jobs and practiced their religion. III 
The union claimed that the accommodation was inherently 
unreasonable because it would result in unequal treatment. HI 
The court found that unequal treatment is not by itself unrea-
sonable. ll8 Since no other employee's rights were compromised 
by the accommodation, the union had no substantial costs, and 
the plaintiffs suffered the same economic loss, the accommbda-
tion was reasonable. ll4 
The union also asserted that allowing this accommodation 
would deprive the union of funds necessary to its operation, 
thereby resulting in undue hardship. HI The Ninth Circuit ac-
cepted the district court findings that the union had ample 
money in its reserve to accommodate all the religious employees 
and still maintain a surplus.llI Although the Ninth Circuit ac-
knowledged that the de minimis standard announced in Hardi-
son applied, it stated that a determination of hardship depended 
109. 648 F.2d at 1242. See note 4 supra for the text of the statute on employer 
agreements with labor organizations. 
110. For the text of § 19 of the National Labor Relations Act, see note 131 infra. 
111. 648 F.2d at 1242. 
112. ld. at 1243. 
113. ld .. 
114. ld. 
115. [d. 
116. [d. (relying on Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1027, 1030-31 (D. 
Or. 1979)). 
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on the facts, and could not be extrapolated from a hypothetical 
situation.ll7 As a result, unless a union can show that an accom-
modation will deprive it of funds necessary to its operation, dis-
trict court findings of no undue hardship will not be rejected by 
the Ninth Circuit as clearly erroneous.U8 
The final issue was whether section 701(j) violated the first 
amendment as an establishment of religion. The Ninth Circuit 
stressed that the Supreme Court's definition of neutrality has 
enough flexibility to accommodate the religious practices of each 
religion.ll8 As long as the government remains neutral between 
different religious sects and does not sponsor, support or involve 
itself in religious activities, there is no first amendment viola-
tion.1l10 The Ninth Circuit held that the accommodation did not 
violate any of these requirements. First, this charity substitution 
provision put the plaintiffs on equal footing with the rest of the 
employees who had no religious objection to unions, thus main-
taining the government's neutrality in the face of religious dif-
ferences. 1lI1 Second, there was no sponsorship, support or assis-
tance .involved since employees with religious objections are not 
granted an exemption but are merely allowed to substitute dues 
for charity, thereby suffering the same economic loss as non-reli-
gious employees.1IlI 
The court th~n applied the Lemon-Nyquist testllll to deter-
mine section 701(j)'s constitutionality. First, the statute must re-
flect a clearly secular purpose. The union contended that this 
requirement 'was not met because Congress enacted section 
701(j) to secure special privileges for some religions.1I4 The court 
refuted this contention by concluding that section 701(j) was 
merely part of a statutory scheme designed to eradicate employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of certain invidious criteria.1U 
ll7. 648 F.2d at 1243. 
ll8.Id. 
ll9. Id. at 1244. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 1245. 
<0 122, Id . 
. ,,,. 123: A law withstancjs constitutional challenge if it (1) has a secular legislative pur· 
pose; (2) has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibIts religion; and (3) does 
not involve excessive government entanglement w,jth religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 612·13 (1971). ~ 
124. 648 F.2d at 1245. 
125. Id. 
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Since this purpose is wholly secular, the court concluded that 
the statute had a clearly secular purpose.1lI8 
Second, the statute's primary effect must neither advance 
nor inhibit the plaintiff's religion. The union argued that al-
lowing the employee to substitute charity for dues gave him a 
freedom of choice unavailable to other employees. Ill" The court 
classified this benefit as incidental and ancillary and rejected the 
union's argument that this choice conferred a primary benefit on 
the plaintiff's religion. U8 The union also argued that exempting 
the plaintiffs from union dues would result in curtailing union 
services or raising dues to make up for the loss, either of which 
imposes the burden of accommodation on unaccommodated pri-
vate parties. The court answered this argument by stating that 
an inappreciable abstract burden is not enough to establish a 
first amendment violation. 118 
The third part of the Lemon-Nyquist test requires no exces-
sive government entanglement. The Ninth Circuit summarily 
concluded that the administration of the accommodation in-
volved little or no government supervision.Jlo 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
It must be noted at the outset that the precise issue decided 
in Tooley-accommodating a religious objection to the payment 
of union dues-has become moribund due to Congress' recent 
amendment of section 19 of the National Labor Relations Act.l8l 
126. [d. 
127. [d. at 1246. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. 
130. [d. 
131. Act of Dec. 24. 1980, Pub. L. No. 96·593, 94 Stat. 3452 provides in part: 
Any employee who is a member of and adheres to estab· 
Iished and traditional tenets or teachings of a bona fide relig-
ion, body or sect which has historically held conscientious ob-
jections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations 
shall not be required to join or financially support any labor 
organization as a condition of employment; except that such 
employee may be required in a contract between such employ-
ees [sicl employer and a labor organization in lieu of periodic 
dues and initiation fees, to pay sums equal to such dues and 
initiation fees to a nonreligious, nonlabor organization charita-
ble fund .... 
18
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This amendment has obviated the need to determine reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship in the dues paying context. 
Section 19 plainly states that certain religious objectors shall not 
be required to financially support a union but may be required 
to pay an equivalent amount to charity if so provided in the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The statute would be applicable 
even when hardship results since that limitation does not appear 
in the amendment. 
This amendment has accomplished several worthy ends: (1) 
it has abolished any inconsistency among the circuits; (2) it 
frames the employee's right to be free from discrimination in 
this particular context as an absolute and not a conditional right 
subject to a finding of undue hardship; and (3) it establishes 
standards for defining religion. In order to qualify for an exemp-
tion the religioUs objector must show that the individual's belief 
stems from a religious tenet of the church, and that the church 
has historically held a conscientious objection to labor unions. m 
The importance of defining religion can not be underesti-
mated. Although the courts are very hesitant to define religion, 
many commentators have stated that the courts must make 
some kind of determination in this area.188 For example, suppose 
a very conservative Presbyterian refuses to join a union for os-
tensibly religious reasons. Under the Supreme Court's decision 
in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Secur-
ity Division,l84 the courts can inquire no further into the legiti-
132. Id. Section 19 may have raised some constitutional questions. Specifically, that 
one must be a member of a church to qualify for an exemption might run afoul of the 
establishment clause as the statute would benefit certain religions and churches and not 
protect other religious objectors who do not belong to a church. See United States v. 
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 172 (1965). However, a religious objector who does not qualify for 
the automatic exemption under § 19 may still pursue the more general remedy under § 
701(j) of the Civil Rights Act. 
133. See Clark, supra note 71, at 337·39 (courts must at least distinguish between 
conscientious and insouciant believers); Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination 
and the Role of Arbitration Under Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REV. 599, 618·19 (1971) (there 
is a need for a standard by which to measure religious practices). 
134. 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981). The Court stated that a religious claim of exemption is 
not limted to those persons who object to a state law on the basis of a religious tenet but 
also to persons who have a personal religious objection. Thus the first amendment pro· 
tects not only group religious beliefs but individual religious beliefs as well. Since the 
Court has retreated from any analysis of the legitimacy of a religious claim, the result 
will likely be that many persons will claim an exemption on any ground and clothe it 
with religious language. The court will be helpless to expose the true nature of the claim. 
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macy or veracity of the Presbyterian's claims. This is true even 
though the Presbyterian Church does not have a tenet prohibit-
ing union membership. It therefore becomes impossible to sepa-
rate protected religious claims of exemption from unprotected 
moral, social or political claims of exemption. The statute was 
designed not to protect religious individuals who refuse to join a 
union but to protect religious individuals who refuse to join a 
union on religious grounds. Minimally, the individual should be 
required to show a nexus between his religious beliefs and his 
claim of exemption. A religious person may object to a union on 
political grounds. However, since there is no relationship be-
tween his objection and his religion, the claim to exemption 
should fail just as a non-religious individual's claim would fail. 
Although the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Tooley is well rea-
soned, it suffers in one particular respect: It fails to conscien-
tiously apply the standards announced in Hardison, specifically 
the de minimis test. l81 The court implicitly rejected the prece-
dent established by Hardison by holding that the union had suf-
fered no undue hardship. However, if one compares the facts of 
Hardison and Tooley, one is immediately impressed by the great 
disparity between the cost to the defendant TWAin accommo-
dating Hardison and the cost to the defendant Local 8141 in ac-
commodating Tooley. In Hardison, it was estimated that it 
would cost TWA $150 over a period of three months to pay 
overtime wages to replace Hardison for his sabbath absences.l88 
At the end of that three month period Hardison could have 
transferred back to his original department where he had suffi-
cient seniority to avoid Saturday work. Thus the conflict be-
tween Hardison's job and his beliefs was temporary and the cost 
of accommodation was only $150. By contrast, Tooley along with 
five other religious objectors, requested a permanent accommo-
dation which would cost the union $1200 per year.187 Thus, the 
cost borne by the union was eight times greater than that in 
Hardison which the Supreme Court found not de minimis. 
135. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,84 (1977). The Ninth Circuit, as 
well as other courts, has been hesitant to apply the de minimis text as strictly as the 
Supreme Court did in Hardison. One commentator criticized the opinion as parsimoni-
ous and contrary to the broad remedial provisions of the Act. Note, The Supreme Court, 
1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 70, 271 (1977). 
136. 432 U.S. at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
137. Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (D. Or. 1979). 
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The Ninth Circuit and the district court justified their deci-
sions on the grounds that the requested accommodation would 
have merely reduced the union's surplus, resulting in practically 
no hardship at all. Despite the logic of this holding, it is contrary 
to the Hardison decision. Apparently, the Hardison Court con-
sidered the employer's ability to pay irrelevant. As the dissent in 
Hardison pointed out, TWA is one of the largest air carriers in 
the United StateS.I88 To suggest that a $150 cost would re-
pt'esent an undue hardship on the employer's business was sim-
ply ludicrous.18s To put it simply, the Tooley decision does not 
comport with Hardison although it is better reasoned, fairer and 
more closely realizes Congress' intent in enacting section 701(j). 
One of the enigmas surrounding religious discrimination 
cases is why it is treated differently than other types of invidious 
employment discrimination. As the Fifth Circuit stated: "Title 
VII provides a remedy against employment discrimination on 
the basis of an employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin .... The use of the word 'or' evidences Congress' intent 
to prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of 
the listed characteristics. "140 
One possible reason for the different treatment of religious 
discriminatjon is that religion is a matter of choice while race 
and sex are immutable characteristics.1U Notwithstanding this 
distinction, religious discrimination is no less arbitrary than race 
or sex discrimination.l41 Although race and sex discrimination 
are similar to religious discrimination in both content and effect, 
the courts have formulated a lesser standard by which to judge 
religious discrimination. For an employer to fulfill his burden in 
a religious discrimination case he need only show that an accom-
138. 432 U.S. at 91. 
139. 1d. 
140. Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Assoc., 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th 
Cir.198O). 
141. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 133, at 637. This distinction has some support 
in the legislative history which demonstrates Congress' overriding concern with racial 
employment discrimination. See 110 CONGo Rsc. 1521, 1528-29 (1964). 
142. See 110 CONGo Rsc. 1521, 1528-29 (1964). It is somewhat callous to suggest that 
persons could change their religious beliefs to suit the needs of their jobs. It is far more 
likely that religious employees will quit their jobs in order to adhere to their religious 
beliefs. The threat then exists that the adherents of a minority religion will become the 
marginally employed and unemployed members of our society, thus creating a perma-
nent economic underclaas. 
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modation would impose a greater that de minimis cost. How-
ever, an employer who discriminates on the basis of race must 
still satisfy the requirements of the business necessity 
doctrine. 148 
The courts often impose a greater than de minimis cost on 
business and labor to eradicate the effects of past racial employ-
ment discrimination. 14. The Ninth Circuit, in United States u. 
Ironworkers Local 86,141 ordered the defendant union to create 
"special apprenticeship programs designed to meet the special 
needs of average blacks with no previous experience or special 
skills in the trade, or black applicants who have some previous 
experience ... but do not meet journeymen standards."I •• Obvi-
ously, setting up a training program to train persons with sub-
standard skills will be expensive. This requirement illustrates 
how far courts are willing to go to eliminate racial discrimination 
in employment. The courts should go just as far to eliminate re-
ligious discrimination. Undue hardship should be interpreted to 
comply with the business necessity doctrine. 
There are essentially three reasons why the accommodation 
requirement should be set higher. First, a stricter standard 
would promote greater religious diversity and a richer cultural 
heritage. In One court has specifically stated that one of the 
143. One court has defined business necessity to be an irresistible demand: "Neces-
sity connotes an inesistible [sic) demand. To be preserved, [a present employment prac-
tice) ... must not only directly foster safety and efficiency of a plant, but also be 88118D-
tial to those goals." Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir.) (quoting 
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (bracketed 
material and emphasis from Watkins), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). The Ninth Cir-
cuit has recently departed from the absolute necessity requirement announced in Wat-
kins in favor of a reasonable necessity requirement. Contrares v. City of Los Angeles, 656 
F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981). See Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 702-04 (8th 
Cir. 1980). The court described the burden as follows: (1) the plainti1f must show that 
the business practice results in disparate treatment or disparate Impact on a protected 
class; (2) the defendant then must show that the practice is a business necessity; (3) the 
plaintiff' must show it is a pretext for discrimination or that there are non-discriminating 
ways of achieving legitimate business goals. [d. See generally Blumrosen, StraTl/len in 
Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 
MICH. L. RBv. 59 (1972). 
144. See, e.g., United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634, 635 (6th Cir. 1973) 
(union ordered to participate in a minority job training program); accord, Southem m. 
Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 1972). 
145. 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971). 
146. [d. at 548. 
147. See 118 CONGo RBc. 705, 706 (1972) (remarks of Mr. Randolph). The sponsor of 
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main purposes of Title VII was to preserve religious diversity. us 
The real issue, then, is not a religious versus secular confronta-
tion but rather a majority versus minority religious confronta-
tion. Most religions do not have religious objections to unions 
and most keep Sunday as their Sabbath. By refusing to allow 
accommodation to minority views, some courts have implicitly 
stated that only those views that accede to majoritarian doc-
trines merit first amendment protection. The Supreme Court 
has stated that any religion, no matter how unconventional, 
merits first amendment protection. I.e 
A second reason for imposing a stricter standard of accom-
modation is· to protect the individual's right to religious free-
dom. This was Congress' most pressing concern in amending sec-
tion 19 of the National Labor Relations Act to include all 
religious objectors. lllo One commentator has suggested that too 
little value is given to the principle of religious freedom,ll1l and 
has criticized the undue hardship test because "[fjairness fur-
ther demands that protection of religious liberty be founded on 
social and moral values rather than on business expediency or 
incremental increases in social efficiency."ll1l1 The author soundly 
pointed out that the application of the undue hardship test re-
sults in an enigma: If an employee is highly skilled and hard to 
replace, it is more likely that his religious exemption will be de-
feated on the grounds of undue hardship. On the other hand, an 
unskilled and easily replaceable employee will enjoy greater reli-
§ 701(j) lamented that employer practices were decimating the ranks of many minority 
religions. Id. 
148. Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 141 (5th Cir. 1975). 
149. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1430 
(1981). The free exercise clause was designed to protect the one percent who hold differ-
ent religious views, Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.J. Super. 63, 70, 274 
A.2d 832, 840 (1971), and ensure that the rights bestowed by the first ten amendments 
are not subject to a majority vote. sur v. State Democratic Executive Comm., 500 F.2d 
1307, 1308 (5th Cir. 1974). 
150. Several ·congressmen voiced apprehension over imposing on the employee the 
grievous choice of either obeying one's religion or keeping one's job. See 126 CONGo REC. 
760, 761 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1980) (remarks of Messrs. Hinson, Clauson and Erlenborn). 
151. Note, supra note 54, at 884. 
152. Id. at 891. Ct. Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d at 1244 (the court 
implied that if many employees objected to dues on religious grounds they need not be 
accommodated); Clark, supra note 71, at 332. "Similarly, the number of persons who 
invoke the privilege of [conscientious objection to some law] has been considered by 
commentators to be a highly important fact in estimating whether a constitutional right 
to such objection should exist." Id. 
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gious freedom.1II3 One's visceral reaction to this allocation of ba-
sic human rights by reference to an individual's economic value 
is that such allocation is contrary to the spirit of our constitu-
tional freedoms which do not distinguish between rich and poor, 
urban and rural, black and white. 1M 
Assuming that the standard for acommodation does not 
present cultural diversity or individual rights problems, the 
standard cannot be justified even by a close economic analysis. 
The rationale for the undue hardship test is that business 
should not bear excessive costs that are uneconomical and ineffi-
cient. From a purely economic perspective, this appears to be a 
wise policy (assuming efficiency is the highest goal in our eco-
nomic system) but it is an extremely myopic view because it 
overlooks several hidden costs. First, the company may lose the 
services of a highly valued employeelllil and have to train a re-
placement. Second, there are several significant social costs 
which need to be calculated to arrive at an economic result. One 
of three events can happen to a terminated employee: (1) find a 
similar job in another company, (2) find a lower skilled job!" or 
(3) remain unemployed. 
The latter two choices are probably more realistic because 
the same factors which previously conflicted with the employee's 
religion will presumably appear again in similar companies. In 
the second scenario, the employee is transformed from a fully 
productive to a marginally productive worker. Some of his for-
merly utilized skills are wasted representing a significant social 
cost. Far more serious is the third scenario which imposes griev-
ous cost on society. In this case, the employee contributes noth-
ing to the productivity of the economy and in fact becomes an 
economic liability through unemployment insurance payments. 
153. Note, supra note 54, at 884. 
154. See Richards v. Townsend, 303 F. Supp. 793, 795 (N.D. Cal. 1969), modified on 
other grounds, 444 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1971). 
155. Cf, Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 518 (6th Cir. 
1975) (plaintiff was a competent employee whose services were highly valued by the com-
pany); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(Plaintiff was, by all accounts, an excellent employee and enjoyed a good relationship 
with peers and supervisors alike.). 
156. Note, supra note 54, at 884. 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/5
1982] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 
Although these costs are less visible than the cost of accommo-
dation, they are no less real and may in fact be greater. By im-
posing a higher standard of accommodation on the employer, it 
will force him to internalize many of these costs that previously 
were borne by society. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In Tooley, the Ninth Circuit took another step to insure re-
ligious liberty in the face of an apparently contrary Supreme 
Court decision in Hardison. Although the specific holding was 
narrow, the Tooley court has given a broad definition to the 
statute. The problem of non-payment of union dues was legisla-
tively handled and will probably not arise often. However, in 
reference to other requested accommodations, the appropriate 
standard should be the business necessity doctrine, a higher 
standard which will better promote religious diversity, individ-
ual freedoms, and efficiency. 
Jeff Kirk 
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATEWIDE ANTI-BUS-
ING LAW THAT DEFEATS A LOCAL DESEGREGA-
TION PLAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Seattle School District No.1 v. Washington,t the Ninth 
Circuit held that a state law banning busing for purposes of 
" ... I(!chool desegregation, but not for other school purposes, is an im-
permissible legislative classification based on racial criteria. The 
coUrt's ruling, striking down on equal protection grounds a 
statewide /ilDti-busing initiative, should be very encouraging to 
school districts· which are trying voluntarily. to desegregate. 
Three local school districts sued to enjoin the enforcement 
of the anti-busing law, Initiative 350, an amendment to the state 
education code adopted by a substantial majority of Washington 
1. 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Ely, J.; the other panel members were Nelson, 
J. and Wright, J. dissenting), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 
81-9). 
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state's voters in November 1978.1 The challenged statute, while 
not expressly racial in nature, created a "neighborhood schools 
policy," that permits local school districts to reassign and bus 
students out of their neighborhood for every significant educa-
tional purpose8 except that of rectifying racial imbalances in the 
public schools. Court-ordered school busing for racial integration 
is unaffected by the statute.· 
Prior to the enactment of Initiative 350, the three plaintiff 
school districts had begun a variety of programs aimed at elimi-
2. Seattle School Oist. No.1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. 996, 1009 (W.O. Wash. 
1979). The measure was approved by a 66% margin statewide. The margin by unofficial 
tally in Seattle was 61 % citywide, but it failed in two legislative districts of the city with 
heavy minority voting. 473 F. Supp. at 1009. The plaintiff districts are Seattle, Tacoma, 
and Pasco, Washington. 
3. Initiative 350 provides, in relevant part: 
Section 1. [NJo school board, school district ... , nor the 
superintendent of public instruction . . . , shall directly or 
indirectly require any student to attend a school other than 
the school which is geographically nearest or next nearest the 
student's place of residence . . . , except in the following 
instances: 
(1) If a student requires special education ... he may be 
assigned and transported to the school offering courses and fa-
cilities for such special education . . . ; 
(2) If there are health or safety hazards . . . between the 
student's place of residence and the nearest or next nearest 
school; or 
(3) If the school nearest or next nearest ... is unfit or 
inadequate because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack 
of physical facilities. 
Section 3. For purposes of section 1 of this act, "(tol indi-
rectly require any student to attend a school other than the 
school which is geographically nearest or next nearest ... " in-
cludes, but is not limited to, implementing, continuing, pursu-
ing, maintaining or operating any plan involving (1) the rede-
fining of attendance zones; (2) feeder schools; (3) the 
reorganization of the grade structure of the schools; (4) the 
pairing of schools; (5) the merging of schools; (6) the clustering 
of schools; or (7) any other combination of grade restructuring, 
pairing, merging or clustering: PROVIDED, that nothing in 
this chapter shall limit the authority of any school district to 
close school facilities. 
Section 6. This chapter shall not prevent any court of 
competent jurisdiction from adjudicating constitutional issues 
relating to the public schools. 
633 F.2d at 1343 n.3. 
4. 1d. Nowhere in the statute is there mention of desegregation. 
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nating the effects of segregated community housing patterns. 
These programs involved both voluntary and mandatory reas-
signment of students, thereby subjecting them to the new state 
law. II Seattle, the largest of the three plaintiff districts, was not 
under court order to desegregate its schools. Two years before 
Initiative 350 was adopted, however, the Seattle district had vol-
untarily agreed to desegregate.- To achieve racial balance, the 
district adopted the Seattle Plan, a program which included 
mandatory busing. Although the Plan met with vigorous local 
opposition,' the state court upheld it.· The board members 
adopting the Seattle Plan narrowly defeated a recall attempt by 
the organization that later sponsored Initiative 350.9 Had the 
state enforced the initiative, the Seattle Plan, and desegregation 
efforts in Pasco and Tacoma, would have ground to a halt.10 
The trial court found Initiative 350 discriminatory, over-
5. 473 F. Supp. at 1002-07. Pasco adopted a busing plan in the Spring of 1965. Only 
minority students had been bused. Tacoma operated a variety of optional enrollment 
and voluntary busing programs since 1960 involving about 1,400 students. Seattle, faced 
with numerous complaints under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, signed a memo· 
randum of agreement to end segregation with the Office for Civil Rights on June 7, 1978. 
The Seattle school board mandated busing under the Seattle Plan, adopted in March 
1978 and implemented the following September. The Seattle school district had been 
busing since 1972, and had desegregation programs as early as 1963. A "magnet" school 
program, implemented in 1977-78, was to encourage students to transfer voluntarily from 
their neighborhood schools to the "magnet school" which contained educationally·en-
hanced curricula. Id. at 1006. 
6. Id. at 1007. The major feature of the Seattle Plan is the permanent assignment of 
entire neighborhoods of students to schools other than those geographically closest to 
their homes for a portion of their school careen. Additionally, there were other voluntary 
assignment options in some areas. Id. 
7. Id. at 1006-08. 
8. Roe v. Seattle School Dist. No. I, No. 838291 (King County Superior Ct., 1978) 
(order denying injunction) and No. 838530 (King County Superior Ct., 1978) (order de-
nying summary judgment). 
9. 473 F. Supp. at 1006. The group sponsoring the recall and seeking to enjoin the 
busing plan called itself Citizens for Voluntary Integration Committee (CiVIC), a non-
profit corporation. Id. at 1007. That organization subsequently sponsored Initiative 350. 
Id. 
10. 473 F. Supp. at 1010-11. The state never enforced Initiative 350 because the 
district court issued a preliminary injunction. 633 F.2d at 1341-42. At the time of the 
injunction, the trial court granted the motion of eight Washington public interest groups 
to intervene in the litigation to test whether Seattle and Tacoma schools were, in fact, 
unconstitutionally segregated. The court bifurcated the litigation as follows: Phase I, 
from which this appeal stems, dealt only with the constitutionality of Initiative 350. 
Phase n, which was never reached because of the invalidity of the initiative, derives from 
the intervenors' claim that the school districts operate unlawful dual school systems. Id. 
at 1341. 
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broad, and violative of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment because it created an illegal racial classifica-
tion. l1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 11 
This Note will explore the basis for the holding in Seattle 
and discuss its significance to statewide anti-desegregation mea-
sures, and its relevance to California's Proposition I, an anti-
busing measure which the California Court of Appeal has 
upheld.18 
B. BACKGROUND 
Equal Protection 
Racially discriminatory laws have long been held invalid 
under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, I. 
11. 633 F.2d at 1342. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's denial of attorneys fees to the plaintiffs 
(both the school districts and the intervenors) as an abuse of discretion. rd. at 1347-50. 
Public entities (such 'as school districts) are not exempted from the protections of the 
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), which autho-
rizes the court "in its discretion" to award fees to prevailing parties, and 20 U.S.C. I 
3205 (Supp. II 1978), part of the Emergency School Aid Act that provides for attorneys 
fees for civil rights litigation involving schools. School districts are eligible to receive 
attorneys fees as prevailing parties under §§ 1988 and 3205 "as long as [the) publicly· 
funded organization advances important constitutional values." 633 F.2d at 1348 (cita-
tions omitted). The court ruled that the "bad faith" exception to attorney fee awards 
applies only to named defendants in their individual, not their official, capacities. rd. at 
1349 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693·700 (1978) and Williams v. Alioto, 625 
F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
Intervenors were likewise entitled to attorneys fees despite their "de minimis" role 
in the litigation. They were prevailing parties under § 3205 because even though the 
Phase II issues were not reached, "an award is permissible for an issue ... not fully 
litigated if constitutional rights are vindicated through the mechanism of a consent de-
cree or other preliminary relief." 633 F.2d at 1349 (citing S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5912·13). 
12. 633 F.2d at 1350. 
13. Crawford v. Board of Educ. (Crawford II), 113 Cal. App. 3d 633,170 Cal. Rptr. 
495 (1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81·38). 
14. The clause provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which ... [de· 
nies) to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
The Court has held that "all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal 
before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the 
[fourteenth) amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made 
against them by law because of their color .... " Strauder V. West Virginia, 100 U.s. 
303, 307 (1880) (overturning statute that provided "only white male persons who are 
twenty·one years of age and who are citizens of this state" may serve on juries). See also 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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whether the racial classification in a challenged law is overtly or 
covertly discriminatory .11 
In Reitman v. Mulkey,I8 the Supreme Court also proscribed, 
under the equal protection clause, state enactments which ex-
pressly sanction private discrimination.17 The Reitman Court 
struck down a California initiativel8 that had effectively re-
pealed fair housing laws and forbade the state from regulating 
private racial discrimination in housing. The Court found the 
California law's" 'immediate objective', its 'ultimate effect', its 
'historical context and the conditions existing prior to its enact-
ment' "19 were to dispossess minorities of vested rights, and con-
cluded the law violated the fourteenth amendment as discrimi-
natory "state action. ".0 
School officials have broad authority to desegregate, inde-
pendent of any finding of a constitutional violation. In Swann v. 
Board of Education,ll the Court decided: "If school authorities 
fail in their affirmative obligations under these holdings, [fed-
eral] judicial authority may be invoked.''1· In a companion case, 
Board of Education v. Swann,l8 the Court overturned a state 
anti-busing law which would have prevented a school board from 
carrying out a court-ordered desegregation plan in a district that 
15. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
16. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
17. 1d. at 381. 
18. In 1964, California voters adopted Proposition 14, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26, which 
stated in relevant part: 
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof 
shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of 
any person who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any 
part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent 
such property to such person as he, in his absolute discretion, 
chooses. 
387 U.S. at 371. The Court said this law did not merely repeal an existing law forbidding 
racial discrimination. Rather, it established racial discrimination as "one of the basic 
policies of the State" in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 1d. at 380-81. 
19. 387 U.S. at 373. 
20. 1d. at 380-81. 
21. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Court said school authorities have "broad discretionary 
powers" and in the exercise thereof "might well conclude" as a matter of educational 
policy "that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school 
should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for 
the district as a whole." 1d. 
22. 1d. at 15. 
23. 402 U.S. 43 (1971). 
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was de jure segregated.14 
In Milliken v. Bradley,sa the Court held that suburban 
school districts around segregated Detroit schools were appar-
ently innocent of any intentional segregative acts, hence, not 
under a constitutional duty to participate in Detroit's desegrega-
tion plans. 
Although the Supreme Court has never held that local 
school board policies have constitutional pre-eminence over 
state law, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guezl6 and in Milliken, the Court emphasized some of the social 
values of local control and autonomy in public education." 
Racial Classifications 
Government may not, through legislation, impose a special 
burden on minorities in its attempts to achieve equal rights, the 
Court held in Hunter v. Erickson. le In Hunter, the Court over-
turned a city charter amendment that required a special referen-
dum to enact local fair housing laws.11 The Court said that while 
the law was race-neutral on its face, it created a disproportion-
ate burden on minorities seeking racial equality in housing and 
thus "constitutes a real, substantial, and invidious denial of the 
24. "[I)f a state· imposed limitation on a school authority's discretion operates to 
inhibit or obstruct the operation of a unitary school system or impede the disestablishing 
of a dual school system, it must fall; state policy must give way when it operates to 
hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees." ld. at 45. 
25. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (judicial desegregation remedies must not exceed the geo· 
graphical scope of the constitutional violation). 
26. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
27. ld. at 50 (dictum); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 741·42. In Milliken, the 
Court said: "No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local 
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential 
both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to 
quality of the educational process." ld. 
28. 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969). 
29. Akron City Charter amend. § 137 provided in part: 
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Ak· 
ron which regulates the use, sale, advertisement, tran.fer, list· 
ing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real property of 
any kind ... on the basis of race, color, religion, national ori· 
gin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the 
electors voting on the question at a regular or general election 
before said ordinance shall be effective. 
393 U.S. at 387. 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/5
1982] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 
equal protection of the laws."·o Because the law restricted adop-
tion of only fair housing laws and not other forms of racial or 
housing laws, it was not "grounded in neutral principles of 
law"·l and created an explicitly racial classification.8I 
In Lee v. Nyquist,·· a New York district court applied the 
Hunter reasoning to school desegregation and busing. The Lee 
court overturned a state anti-busing laWS· because "the purpose 
is clearly an impermissible one . . . [,] it structures the internal 
governmental process in a manner not f~unded on neutral prin-
ciples. . . . The New York legislature has acted to make it more 
difficult for racial minorities to achieve goals that are in their 
interest."11I However, since Hunter, the Supreme Court in Wash-
ington v. Davis·e has held disproportionate impact alone, absent 
a showing of discriminatory purpose, insufficient to prove a con-
stitutional violation.17 
30. 393 U.S. at 393. 
31. Id. at 395. Justice Harlan concurring, expounded at length on the distinction 
between discriminatory legislation, such as the Akron ordinance, and general laws which 
establish the various political structures of government. Statutes of the latter type do 
not violate the equal protection clause merely because they occasionally operate to diaad-
vantage the Black political interests. Id. at 394. "If a governmental institution is to be 
fair, one group cannot always be expected to win." Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). 
32. Id. at 392-93. 
33. 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971). 
34. The statute that gave rise to Lee was a 1969 state anti-busing law, N.Y. EDuc. 
LAw § 3201 (McKinney 1969). 
The purpose of [section 3201(2)] is to control the practice 
initiated by the Commissioner of Education in this State of 
assigning youngsters to public schools on the basis of race or 
color in order to achieve a certain racial balance or quota, with 
all of the waste, disruption, community upheaval and expense 
which generally accompany such a move. 
. . . [D]espite the mounting evidence of the failures of 
these [racial balancing] schemes, they have continued to be 
foisted upon unwilling communities by the Commiasioner of 
Education. 
318 F. Supp. at 717 (quoting New York State Senate Debate on A. 214 (1969), at 2454, 
2459). 
The Lee court said that § 3201, which only affected bUSing programs by the state, 
"creates a single exception to the broad supervisory powers the state Commiasioner of 
Education exercises over local public education." 318 F. Supp. at 718. That exception 
creates a racial classification because it places "burdens on the implementation of educa-
tional policies designed to deal with race on the local level." Id. at 719. 
35. 318 F. Supp. at 720 (citations omitted). 
36. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
37. Id. at 240. 
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The Supreme Court has consistently applied the strictest 
scrutiny to racially discriminatory laws.ls Under this high level 
of scrutiny, racial classifiers on their face violate the equal pro-
tection clause unless: (1) the classification serves an overriding 
or compelling governmental interest;811 (2) the law is necessary to 
the accomplishment of a permissible state policy; and (3) the 
law is the least discriminatory means of achieving that govern-
mental or state goal. 40 
School Desegregation 
In Brown v. Board of Education,41 the Court, holding that 
"[s]eparate educational facilities [for black children] are inher-
ently unequal"411 because such treatment generates feelings of 
"inferiority as to their status in the community,"41 ordered the 
defendant school district to desegregate "with all deliberate 
speed."" Since Brown, the Court has imposed upon local s'chool 
districts an affirmative constitutional duty "to eliminate from 
the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed {de jure] segre-
gation/'411 as distinguished from de facto segregation caused by 
demographic and economic factors." 
Lower courts have uniformly struck down anti-busing laws 
when such laws hampered efforts of de jure segregated districts 
to fulfill their constitutional duty." The Supreme Court has yet 
38. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192·96 (1964). See auo Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. I, 11 (1967). 
39. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
40. 1d. at 196. 
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
42. 1d. at 495. 
43. 1d. at 494. 
44. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
45. Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 15 (1971) (emphasis added). Note that the 
Seattle court found the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation to be "con· 
stitutionally irrelevant in this context:' 
46. Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). There, the Court said: 
"[PJlaintiffs must prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was 
brought about or maintained by intentional state action ... [consisting of) an unconsti-
tutional policy of deliberate racial segregation .... " 1d. at 198. 
47. Albertson, Equal Protection and the Neighborhood School Concept, 55 WASH. 
L. REV. 735, 738 (1980). This article concerning Seattle at the trial court level cited Stell 
v. Board of Public Educ., 334 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Ga. 1971); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 
710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971); Alabama v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 
1319 (S.D. Ala.), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 954 (1970); School Comm. of Springfield v. 
Board of Educ., 366 Mass. 315, 319 N.E.2d 427 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975). 
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to rule on the constitutionality of state legislation that blocks 
busing in de facto segregated districts. Seattle may become the 
test case on that question. 
C. COURT'S REASONING: A RACIAL CLASSIFIER THAT RESTRUC-
TURES THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
The trial court based its legal conclusions on findings that 
Initiative 350 (1) was motivated by discriminatory purpose;4I (2) 
was overbroad;fe and (3) created an invalid racial classifier. The 
appellate court refused to discuss the first two findings. &0 
Rather, the Ninth Circuit focussed primarily on the principles 
enunciated in Hunterll1 and held that the challenged statute was 
"correctly struck down as an impermissible legislative classifica-
tion based on racial criteria."&S Regardless of the voters' motiva-
Only one such case has reached the Supreme Court: Board of Educ. v. Swann, 402 
U.S. 43 (1971). In Swann, the Court affirmed the lower courts' position and held that 
"[t]o forbid, at this stage, all assignments made on the basis of race would deprive school 
authorities of the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional obli-
gation to eliminate existing dual school systems." [d. at 46. 
48. 473 F. Supp. at 1013. The court did not claim that the voters of Washington had 
a subjectively discriminatory intent in adopting Initiative 350. In fact, it conceded that 
many voters may have been motivated by the conviction that it would be in the beat 
interests of their children to attend neighborhood schools. However, the trial judge said 
subjective intent is not the constitutional teat of illegal discriminatory intent or purpose 
that would render this law invalid. Rather the teat, found in Village of Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), is based on five circumstantial 
factors: (a) the impact of the action, i.e., whether it bore more heavily upon one race 
than upon another; (b) the historical background of the decision; (c) the specific se-
quence of events leading to the decision; (d) the procedural and substantive departures 
from the norm in connection with the decision or action; and, (e) the legislative or ad-
ministrative history of the decision or action. 473 F. Supp. at 1014. The judge found that 
Initiative 350 would cause a disproportionate negative impact on the education of minor-
ity children, and said the enactment was "conceived, drafted, advocated and adopted for 
the specific purpose of overriding [school busing] to balance Seattle schools racially by 
means of student assignments." [d. at 1015. 
49. 473 F. Supp. at 1016. The court found that "Initiative 350 is overly inclusive in 
that it prohibits school assignments to achieve racial balance even in a school district 
where there is de jure segregation, that is, segregation caused by prior governmental 
action." [d. The court held that districts are under an affirmative duty to take "whatever 
steps might be necessary to eliminate [de jure] segregation." [d. (citing Board of Educ. v. 
Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) and Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968». "[A] 
statute which would proscribe a principal, and in some cases eBSentia! and exclusive step 
to achieve that end must obviously violate constitutional requirements." San Francisco 
Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 955, 479 P.2d 669, 680, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309, 
320, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012 (1971). 
50. 633 F.2d at 1342. 
51. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra, for a discussion of Hunter. 
52. 633 F.2d at 1342. 
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tion, the "operative legal and political effect" on Initiative 350 
was discriminatory.1I8 The court further found that the law was 
"conceived, drafted, advocated and adopted for the specific pur-
pose of overriding the decision of the Seattle school board to 
balance Seattle schools racially by means of student 
assignments. "114 
Following the reasoning in Hunterli ll and Lee," the Seattle 
court said that even though the statute contains no explicit ra-
cial classification, it contains one implicitly,lI'1 which is invalid 
because it places unconstitutional "special burdens on racial mi-
norities within the governmental process."1I1 
The court found Initiative 350 to cause the political process 
to become "skewed at the expense of local representative bodies 
and their constituencies,"119 and held that the law "radically 
restructure[d] the political process of Washington by allowing a 
state-wide majority to usurp traditional local authority over 10-
53. [d. at 1343. 
54. [d. 
55. See 393 U.S. at 389-90, 392·93. Sef! also id. at 393·96 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
56. See 318 F. Supp. at 718·20. 
57. Although the initiative does not explicitly disallow stu· 
dent assignment for racial reasons, as did the New York stat· 
ute considered in Lee v. Nyquist, it achieves the same purpose 
by enumerating those purposes for which there may be stu· 
dent assignment and omitting from that enumeration the as· 
signment of students in order to achieve racial balance. This is 
as effective a racial classification as is a statute which ex· 
pressly forbids the assignment of students for racial balancing 
purposes. 
633 F.2d at 1343 (citing the trial court, 473 F. Supp. at 1013). 
58. 633 F.2d at 1344. 
59. [d. at 1346. "Had a successor school board to the one that adopted the Seattle 
Plan-instead of the state electorate as a whole-attempted to repeal or rescind the self· 
imposed student assignment plan, we would be faced with a quite different issue." [d. at 
1345·46 n.8. Significantly, the court found: 
"The question of whether a rescisaion of previous Board 
action is in and of itself a violation of appellants' constitu· 
tional rights is inextricably bound up with the question of 
whether the Board was under a constitutional duty to take the 
action it initially took .... If the Board was not under such a 
duty, then the rescission of the initial action in and of itself 
cannot be a constitutional violation." 
rd. (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406, 413·14 (1977». 
The Seattle majority distinguished Dayton [ on the grounds that in Seattle a differ· 
ent governmental body-the state· wide electorate-rescinded policies voluntarily en· 
acted by local school boards already subject to local political control. rd. at 1346. 
34
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/5
1982] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 59 
cal school board educational policies."eo 
Given the finding of a racially suspect classification in Initi-
ative 350, and an impermissible usurpation of local control over 
local educational policy, the court found the initiative invalid 
absent a compelling state interest.e1 In upholding the trial court, 
the Ninth Circuit found no compelling state interest in re-
turning the Seattle schools to the traditional neighborhood 
schools policy.ell While neighborhood schools policies are not per 
se constitutionally suspect,88 on balance, "[t]he interest ... in 
mandating a state-wide policy of neighborhood schools must, in 
these circumstances, fall to the paramount interest of locally 
elected school boards ... in promulgating their own educational 
policy,"84 the court reasoned. 
The court discounted the fact that the Seattle schools had 
never been adjudged to be de jure segregated, citing Leesa for 
the principle that "a finding of de jure segregation is irrelevant 
when majoritarian political processes are used to frustrate mi-
nority participation .... "ee Finding no compelling state inter-
est in wresting control from local districts over educational poli-
cies, the court held the statute unconstitutional as a violation of 
the equal protection clause.67 The court also flatly rejected other 
defense assertions in the opinion." 
60: 633 F.2d at 1344. 
61. Id. at 1344 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192·96 (1964). 
62. 633 F.2d at 1346. Cf. Association of Gen. Contr. v. San Francisco Unified School 
Dist., 616 F.2d 1381, 1388-90 (9th Cir.) (state interest in lowest-bid contracting policy in 
employment had priority over the school board's non-educational interest in voluntarily 
adopting a minority affirmative action program), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 783 (1980). 
63. 633 F.2d at 1345. The court said: "While 'a neighborhood school policy is not 
constitutionally suspect', it is the locally·elected school authorities who 'are traditionally 
charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy' .... " rd. (ci· 
tations omitted). 
64. 633 F.2d at 1346. 
65. 318 F. Supp. at 719-20. See also Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 218 (1980). 
66. 633 F.2d at 1345-46. 
67. Id. at 1346·47. 
68. The defendants cited Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (uphold· 
ing congressional budgetary amendments that barred the Department of Health, Educa· 
tion, and Welfare (HEW) from withholding federal aid to school districts with neighbor· 
hood school assignment policies). The Ninth Circuit said the amendments in Brown did 
not" 'make [a] classification along impermissible [racial] lines,''' as did Initiative 350, 
and Brown was therefore inapposite. 633 F.2d at 1347 (quoting Brown v. Califano, 627 
F.2d at 1230). 
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The Dissent: No Discriminatory Intent 
Judge Wright, dissenting, contended the Washington stat-
ute was valid: It interfered with no constitutional obligations of 
local school boards because the law exempted court-ordered de-
segregation from its provisions," and no unlawful racial classifi-
cation existed. Initiative 350 merely addressed a racial issue: de-
segregation. The majority has "confus[ed] the treatment of 
racial problems with treatment on the basis of race.'''70 
Absent a racial classifier, the applicable cases' 1 require 
proof of discriminatory intent or purpose in adopting the chal-
lenged law to show a violation of the equal protection clause." 
But motive or purpose mixes questions of law and fact, and the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving that discriminatory intent 
was a motivating factor in its adoption." The dissent found no 
evidence that racial bias motivated a desire to restore neighbor-
hood schools.'· The majority merely inferred such intent, the 
dissent said, based on the adverse impact the challenged statute 
had upon racial minorities. Impact alone, however, is constitu-
tionally insufficient. '7& 
The dissent further found the Hunter rule inapposite be-
cause the Hunter Court did not hold that the repeal of the ex-
isting fair housing ordinance violated the fourteenth amend-
ment.'76 Rather, the Hunter Court found the city charter 
amendment defective because it subjected future fair housing 
ordinances to a more burdensome legislative process than other 
ordinances. '77 And, because Initiative 350 did not alter the legis-
69. 633 F.2d at 1350. 
70. Id. at 1353. 
71. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, reh. denied, 444 U.S. 887 
(1979); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Dayton I, 433 U.S. 406 
(1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
72. 633 F.2d at 1353. 
73. Id. at 1353-54 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). 
74. 633 F.2d at 1354. 
75. Id. at 1354. The dissent cited the trial court's factual findings 7.30, 7.31 and 
7.32, 473 F. Supp. at 1009-10, which acknowledged the many non-discriminatory ratio-
nales for supporting neighborhood schools. 
76. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. at 390 n.5. 
77. Id. at 393. 
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lative process or burden minorities procedurally,78 the state law-
fully exercised its power over educational matters.n 
D. ANALYSIS 
Suspect Classifier 
Initiative 350 is a classic example of a creatively worded and 
attractively promoted ballot measure whose purpose and intent 
is carefully hidden by neutral-sounding phrases and omissions of 
salient detail,8° Initiative 350's express purpose was to stop the 
Seattle Plan and, in so doing, it trapped two other segregated 
school districts in its net.81 
The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the trial court, correctly an-
alyzed Initiative 350 as an implicitly racial law, one whose im-
pact would be to permit white children the luxury of retaining 
their neighborhood schools while black children would either be 
left to fend for themselves in over-crowded ghetto schools,81 or 
bite the bullet and assume the full burden of voluntary desegre-
gation.sa The holding is vulnerable, however, to an attack under 
the Washington v. Davis rationale: Adverse impact alone is a 
constitutionally insufficient basis to attack a law that is not ex-
plicitly discriminatory. To resolve that issue, the Supreme Court 
may remand the Seattle case to the trial court for further evi-
dentiary proceedings on the question of intent. 
To say that Initiative 350, like the charter amendment in 
Hunter or the constitutional amendment in Reitman, is non-dis-
criminatory because it permits voluntary desegregation or be-
cause it allows court-ordered busing begs the question." By for-
78. 633 F.2d at 1353 n.3 (citing WASH. CONST. art. II, § 3, which vests legislative 
authority in the legislature but reserves to the people the power to enact bills indepen-
dently through the initiative process). 
79. 633 F.2d at 1353 n.3. 
SO. See note 3 supra for the relevant text of Initiative 350. 
81. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. at 1009-10 (discussing 
the CiVIC campaign to "stop forced busing"). The initiative explicitly barred the deseg-
regation provisions of the Seattle Plan. The trial court found that th08e programs and 
provisions were the only feasible means to integrate the Seattle schools. Jd. at 1015. 
82. Jd. at 1007, 1015. . 
83. Jd. at 1003, 1007. 
84. The trial court findings made it abundantly clear that only through some form 
of mandatory pupil reassignment, particularly in Seattle, would the districts be able to 
integrate. Jd. 
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bidding every major, effective technique for achieving racial 
balance,BIi the initiative had the "clear purpose of making it 
more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to 
achieve legislation that is in their interest."BI Procedural burden 
is the central question raised by the Hunter rule. 
A Restructuring of the Political Process 
The dissent's contention notwithstanding,'7 Initiative 350 
exploited state-wide anti-integration sentiment to stop the de-
segregation of three of Washington's 300 school districts." The 
law marked a departure from the procedural normS' in overrid-
ing the Seattle School Board's desegregation plan because voters 
who "could not conceivably be affected by any plan for the 
mandatory assignment of students for racial balancing pur-
poses"BO voted on and passed the initiative. 
However, the Ninth Circuit majority appeared to misread 
the law when it found that the state's interest in a neighborhood 
schools policy "must, in these circumstances, fall to the para-
mount interest of the locally-elected school boards and the com-
munity they represent in promulgating their own educational 
policy."Bl Local school districts are creatures of state law;'1 
hence, a local school board has no constitutional prerogative to 
set educational policy in contravention of state law. 
Yet, Swann clearly dictates that local school boards not 
only have a constitutional duty to remedy racial imbalances, but 
they also have "broad discretionary powers" to set the racial mix 
in each school as a matter of educational policy." Locally-
elected school boards should and do have the authority to pass 
independent initiatives to racially balance their schools "quite 
85. 633 F.2d at 1342. See, for example, note 3 3upra. 
86. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. at 395. 
87. Namely, that "the record is devoid of evidence to contradict the state's conten-
tion that historical opposition to the Seattle Plan was motivated by race-neutral con-
cerns." 633 F.2d at 1354-55. 
88. 473 F. Supp. at 1008-09. 
89. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 267 (1977). 
90. 473 F. Supp. at 1016. 
91. 633 F.2d at 1345. See note 21 supra. 
92. Mandatory Busing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 495 P.2d 657 (1972). 
93. Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. at 16. 
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apart from any constitutional requirements . ''IN But that 
does not preclude the state from setting educational policy in 
opposition to local initiatives. 
Under Hunter and Lee, Initiative 350 places unconstitu-
tional burdens on minorities within the political process'" and 
effectively disenfranchises minority voters'" in violation of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
As mentioned by the dissent, local boards share control over 
educational policies with the state.·7 However, as a matter of 
practical public policy, states are· ill-equipped either to dictate 
details of school administration or anticipate the local political 
and social nuances that are part of the calculus of sound educa-
tional policies. . 
E. Seattle vs. CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 1 
The California Court of Appeal in Crawford v. Board of Ed-
ucation·8 upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 1, a state 
anti-busing amendment adopted by the voters· in November 
1979. The parallels between Initiative 350 and Proposition 1, es-
pecially the reliance by the plaintiffs in both cases on Hunter, 
make it useful to consider the implications of Seattle in the 
Court's consideration of the challenge to Proposition 1." 
Proposition 1 Background 
Proposition 1 overrides state decisional lawlOO dealing with 
94. [d. at 45. 
95. 633 F.2d at 1344. See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Lee v. Ny-
quist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971). 
96. 633 F.2d at 1346-47. The plurality for Initiative 350 in Seattle does not detract 
from this point, because Seattle residents voted to retain the school board members who 
adopted the plan. 
97. [d. at 1353. See WASH. CONST. art. 2. 
98. 113 Cal. App. 3d 633,170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3266 
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81-38). 
99. The two cases are to be argued together before the Supreme Court. 
100. Jackson v. Pasadena City School Diat., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. 
Rptr.606 (1963). Jackson held that even in the absence of de jure or intentional segrega~ 
tion, school boards are under an affirmative duty to deal with racial imbalances. In fulfil-
ling that duty "consideration must be given to the various factors in each case, including 
the practical neceBBities of governmental operation ... [,1 the degree of racial imbalance 
in the particular school ... [,1 the difficulty and efl'ectiveneBB of revising school bounda-
ries ... and the availability of other facilities to which students can be transferred." ld. 
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school desegregation. The measure requires state courts to fol-
low the narrower, more conservative federal rulings in applying 
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause to pupil 
school assignment and student busing.lol 
Federal courts, as noted, have authority to order desegrega-
tion only where they identify intentional or purposeful segrega-
tive state action.loll But the California Supreme Court has gone 
further than the United States Supreme Court and has held that 
school districts have an affirmative duty to correct racial imbal-
ances in schools regardless of cause. loa 
Proposition 1 does not relieve schools districts of their duty 
to desegregate under state law, but removes busing from "the 
arsenal of techniques available to state courts" to remedy de 
facto segregation.l04 Significantly, Proposition 1, unlike Initia-
tive 350, does not prohibit school boards from initiating busing 
to integrate their schools. 1011 
Like Initiative 350, Proposition 1 was the product of a 
group seeking to stop, or at least stall, a massive cross-town bus-
ing and desegregation plan in Los Angeles, the state's largest 
school district.loe Unlike Seattle, Los Angeles was under a ten-
year-old state court order to desegregate a de jure system. 1M 
at 882, 382 P.2d at 882, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 610. In San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. 
Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d 669, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309,cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012 
(1971), the court reaffirmed the rule in Jackson that school boards have an affirmative 
duty to alleviate racial imbalance or racial isolation. 
Crawford v. Board of Educ. (Crawford I), 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 
724 (1976) established the duty to undertake "reasonably feasible steps" to alleviate seg· 
regation in the schools regardless of its source. This case completely severed California 
law from the federal rules that distinguish de facto from de jure segregation for purposes 
of the equal protection clause. Id. at 302, 551 P.2d at 42, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 738. Because 
this holding was founded on CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a), it created independent state 
grounds on which to obliterate the de facto-de jure distinction. 
101. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a): 
102. See note 45 supra. 
103. See note 100 supra. See also Glenn, State Court Desegregation Order, 26 
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1183 (1979). 
104. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 651, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 507. 
105. Id. at 651, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 507. 
106. The plan that took effect in September 1978 involved 86,600 students, of which 
32,000 were in a mandatory program. Glenn, supra note 103, at 1216. This was 15% of 
the district's 567,260 students. L.A. Busing Starts Today; Leaders Urge Compliance, 
L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1978, § I, at I, col. 2. 
107. Crawford I, 17 Cal. 3d at 286, 551 P.2d at 30,130 Cal. Rptr. at 727. The order 
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The trial court finding of de jure segregation, however, was over-
turned in Crawford II,108 in light of United States Supreme 
Court rulings handed down since the original trial court desegre-
gation order .1" Desegregation efforts in Los Angeles have been 
stalled as a result of Crawford II. A voluntary desegregation 
plan has been in operation since September 1981,110 pending a 
ruling by the Supreme Court. 
Initiative 350 Distinguished 
The Crawford II court, in dealing with the constitutionality 
of Proposition 1, made several points that distinguish the Cali-
fornia amendment from the Washington law: (1) Proposition 1 
does not prohibit local voluntary desegregation; (2) Proposition 
1 does not create a right to discriminate;111 (3) unlike the charter 
amendment in Hunter, 111 Proposition 1 "embraces the protec-
tion of the fourteenth amendment and does not seek to violate 
it;"118 (4) "rescission of the [Los Angeles desegregation plan] 
cannot be unconstitutional" if the district is under no federal 
constitutional obligation to correct racial imbalance;lu (5) based 
in Crawford [ is No. C 822854 (L.A. Superior Ct. 1976). 
108. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 646, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 503. While the California Supreme 
Court i~ Crawford [ rendered the de facto-de jure distinction moot, the appellate court 
held: 
[N]o federal violation of law was established by the 1970 find· 
ings, and the trial court's identification of the then· existing 
racial segregation within the Los Angeles school system as de 
jure segregation was true only in a Pickwickian sense, and was 
not true at all in the sense of federal law. Because there was 
no evidence of acts done with specific segregative intent and 
discriminatory purpose, there was no federal constitutional vi· 
olation-regardless of the terminology used by the court. 
113 Cal. App. 3d at 646, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 503. 
109. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. 
Brinkman (Dayton I), 443 U.S. 406 (1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 
424 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), cited in Crawford II, 113 Cal. App. 
3d at 640-·41, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 499-500. 
1l0. Los Angeles Schools Open Peacefully, S.F. Chronicle, Sept. 16, 1981, at 5, col. 
4. 
1l1. "[I]t merely removes court-ordered pupil assignment and transportation as a 
remedy available to cure state-proscribed racial imbalance .... tt 113 Cal. App. 3d at 
653, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 508. Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
112. 393 U.S. at 387. 
1l3. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 653, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 509. 
114. [d. at 653, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 509. (citing Dayton I and Dayton 11). This is a 
departure from the reasoning in Seattle, 633 F.2d at 1345-46, as to the power of the state 
to rescind a desegregation plan adopted by a locally-elected board. 
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on the espoused purposes of the California proposition, lUI the 
Crawford II court found no discriminatory or segregative intent 
in Proposition 1;118 and (6) Proposition 1 does not deprive mi-
nority groups of the vested right to an integrated education, it 
merely prevents the courts from chosing court-ordered busing 
from "among scores of remedies available for use by the court to 
end racial isolation."117 In effect, Crawford II holds that no con-
stitutional right to any particular remedy for illegal school segre-
gation exists. 118 
Underlying the positions in both the holding in Crawford 
11119 and the dissent in Seattle110 is a question of the efficacy of 
busing to promote equality in education. Both the Crawford II 
majority and the Seattle dissent cite Justice Powell's dissent in 
Estes v. Metropolitan Branches, Dallas NAACP/11 in which 
Justice Powell made some very disparaging remarks about the 
social costs of busing.111 
115. The amendment declares: 
[It is) necessary to serve compelling public interests, including 
those of making the most effective use of the limited financial 
resources now and prospectively available to support public 
education, maximizing the educational opportunities and pro-
tecting the health and safety of all public school pupils, en-
hancing the ability of parents to participate in the educational 
process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state and 
its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel re-
sources, and protecting the environment. 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). 
116. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 655, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 509. 
117. Id. at 655-56, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 509. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 655, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 509. 
120. 633 F.2d at 1351-52. 
121. 444 U.S. 437 (1980). 
122. The pursuit of racial balance at any cost-the unintended leg-
acy of Green-is without constitutional or social justification. 
Out of zeal to remedy one evil, courts may encourage or set 
the stage for other evils. By acting against one-race schools, 
courts may produce one-race school systems. Parents with 
school age children are highly motivated to seek accesa to 
schools perceived to afford quality education. A desegregation 
plan without community support, typically with objectionable 
transportation requirements and continuing judicial over-
sight, accelerates the exodus to the suburbs of families able to 
move. The children of families remaining in the area affected 
by the court's decree are denied the opportunity to be part of 
an ethnically diverse student body. 
444 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J., disaenting from a dismissal of a writ of certiorari). 
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Busing, of course, is not a constitutional end in itself.1I3 
However, it is a reasonably feasible means, and in many cases 
the only strategy available, to break down the racial barriers 
that have been erected through decades of discriminatory school 
transfer policies. 1 .. Thus, it is no wonder that busing has become 
a volatile code-word at the center of the maelstrom of the school 
integration controversy. To those who have accepted the inevita-
bility and the political imperative of abolishing dual school sys-
tems, as· has the Ninth Circuit majority, busing is a necessary 
fortress for the protection of inviolate rights. 
The Seattle court faced a law nakedly promulgated to pre-
vent local school boards from fulfilling their fourteenth amend-
ment obligations without a court order.lItI The Crawford II court 
faced a different proposition: a law which merely eliminates in-
dependent state grounds as a basis for ordering school busing, 
limiting state courts to what the federal courts can do under the 
federal constitution. lie 
Where busing is the only feasible means to desegregate a 
school district, as is the case in both Los Angeles and Seattle, 
laws banning busing effectively foreclose the possibility of 
integration. 
The United States Supreme Court will have to reconcile 
these two cases in some manner with the Hunter, Reitman and 
Washington holdings. Only Justice Rehnquist, denying a stay of 
a busing order in September 1980 to the Los Angeles school dis-
trict,117 has addressed himself to the issue in Crawford II. He 
said Proposition 1 cannot violate the fourteenth amendment be-
cause it specifically embraces it.11l8 
F. CONCLUSION 
Piercing the transparent veil of Washington'S Initiative 350, 
123. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 505. 
124. Seattle School Dist. No.1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. at 1010-11. 
125. ld. at 1016. 
126. Board of Educ. v. Superior Court, 448 U.S. 1343 (1980). 
127. "'[I]t is indeed difficult to accept the contention that by limiting a state court's 
jurisdiction to that of the federal courts, there is somehow a violation of [the] federal 
constitution.''' 113 Cal. App. 3d at 654,170 Cal. Rptr. at 509 (quoting Board of Educ. v. 
Superior Ct., 448 U.S. 1343, 1345 (1980». 
128. 448 U.S. at 1345. 
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the Ninth Circuit in Seattle has correctly found an explicitly ra-
cial legislative classification which violates the equal protection 
clause. Initiative 350 puts local school districts in a double bind 
if they are constitutionally obliged to desegregate: They either 
violate the equal protection clause or violate the initiative. l •• 
The measure radically restructures the political process, making 
it more difficult for racial minorities to achieve their political 
rights, and usurps the power of local school boards to set local 
educational policies when those policies benefit minority 
groups.180 
Seattle and Crawford II can be distinguished on both fac-
tual and legal grounds, and, therefore, are unlikely to influence 
one another in the United States Supreme Court. 
Robert E. Kroll 
III. THE BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE IN THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the last survey period, the Ninth Circuit decided two 
cases focusing on defenses to Title VIP challenges to employ-
ment practices: Harriss v. Pan American World Airways· and 
129. 473 F. Supp. at 1016. 
130. 633 F.2d at 1346. 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2oooh(6) (1976) (amended 1978». Section 2000e-2(a) reads: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
2. 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Farris, J.; the other panel members were Schroe-
der, J., dissenting; and Anderson, J.). 
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Contreras v. City of Los Angeles.s These cases illustrate a con-
flict within this circuit regarding what an employer must prove 
to prevail against a plaintiff's showing that a facially neutral em-
ployment practice has had a disparate impact on a group pro-
tected under Title VII. 
Purporting to adhere to long-standing Title VII case law, 
the two panels articulated conflicting definitions of the business 
necessity defense. In Harriss, a pregnancy discrimination case, 
the court expressed a standard which adheres closely to tradi-
tional interpretations of the defense, but misapplied it. The 
Contreras panel, on the other hand, although purporting to fol-
low applicable precedent, in fact articulated and applied a 
weaker standard in a case involving an allegedly discriminatory 
testing procedure. 
In Harriss, two Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) 
flight attendants challenged Pan Am's maternity leave policy, al-
leging that the policy had a disparate impact on women, thereby 
violating Title VII prohibitions against sex-based discrimina-
tion.· The Harriss case was tried and decided prior to the 1978 
amendment to Title VII which specifically defines pregnancy-
based employment policies as per se sex discrimination.' The 
appellate court, therefore, analyzed the pregnancy leave policies 
under two theories: as a practice which, although neutral on its 
face, had a disparate impact on women; and as a facial violation 
3. 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were 
Tang, J., concurring and dissenting; and H8IlIIon, D.J., sitting by designation). 
4. 649 F.2d at 672. 
5. The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, 
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected 
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition shall be 
treated the same for all employment. related purposes ... as 
other persons not so affected by similar in their ability or in-
ability to work .... 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978), as amended by Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. Congress amended the Act intending to expressly overrule the 
Supreme Court's holdings in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (pregnancy 
based classifications are not, on their face, sex discrimination under Title VII). By defini-
tion, pregnancy based classifications are per se violations of Title VII. H.R. Rep. No. 948, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4749, 4751. For 
a further discussion of Gilbert, and the pregnancy amendment see Rutherglen, Sexual 
Equality in Fringe Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. REV. 199 (1979). 
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of the Act as amended in 1978.6 The two analyses of the employ-
ment practice in Harriss are separate and distinct theories of 
discrimination, giving rise to separate and distinct defenses. 
The plaintiffs challenged three aspects of Pan Am's mater-
nity leave policy. First, Pan Am required every female flight at-
tendant to notify her supervisor within twenty-four hours upon 
learning of her pregnancy.' After notification, the flight attend-
ants began a mandatory, unpaid leave of absence (the stop-work 
policy).8 Between sixty and ninety days after the birth of the 
child, the plaintiffs were required to return to work (the start-
work policy).' Finally, the defendant denied flight attendants 
the right to accrue seniority after the first ninety days of mater-
nity leave (the seniority policy).Io 
In its pre-amendment analysis, which is the primary con-
cern of this Note, the Harriss panel found all three policies had 
a disparate impact on women, but that the employer had suc-
cessfully justified the stop-work policy as a business necessity.ll 
The court of appeals held that to prove a business necessity a 
defendant must show that the challenged practice "has a mani-
fest relationship to the employment in question."ll The panel 
then remanded the case to the district court for further findings 
on whether the stop-work and seniority policies satisfied the re-
quirements of the business necessity defense.18 
The Contreras plaintiffs, six former city accountants and 
auditors, alleged that two pre-employment screening tests un-
lawfully discriminated against Hispanics.l• In 1976, the positions 
of city accountant and city auditor came within the city's civil 
service rules and regulations, which required incumbent employ-
ees, including the plaintiffs, to pass a written examination before 
assuming the positions of either senior accountant or senior au-
6. 649 F.2d at 673. 
7. Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413, 415 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
8.Id. 
9. Id. at 415-16. 
10. Id. at 415. 
11. 649 F.2d at 676. 
12. Id. at 674 n.3. 
13. Id. at 676, 678. 
14. 656 F.2d at 1271. 
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ditor.lll Prior to 1976, when the plaintiffs were hired, employ-
ment decisions for these positions had been based on oral 
inte~iews. UI 
The Ninth Circuit in Contreras held: first, that plaintiffs 
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination as to the 
senior accountants examination;17 second, that, while success-
fully establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact of the 
auditor examination, the plaintiffs failed to prove that less diS-
criminatory alternatives were available to the defendant;18 and 
finally; that the defendant's proof that the auditor examination 
was job-related satisfied the requirements of the business neces-
sity defense and entitled it to judgment. It 
It is not the purpose of this Note to delve into the intrica-
cies of either the testing or pregnancy areas of Title VII juris-
prudence, but rather to discuss the different theories of discrimi-
nation and focus on a comparison of the two panels' articulation 
and application of the business necessity defense as it stands in 
the Ninth Circuit. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights ActiO prohibits most forms 
of employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, 
religion, or national origin, by employers, labor organizations, 
and employment agencies. II The. Act contains a statutory de-
fense to all facially discriminatory practices (except those prac-
tices which discriminate on the basis of race): the bona fide oc-
cupational qualification (BFOQ).II The Act, however, is silent as 
15.ld. 
16.ld. 
17. ld. at 1274. 
18. ld. at 1285-86. 
19.1d. 
20. 42 U.s.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h(6) (1976) (amended 1978). 
21. ld. § 2000e-2. For relevent text of § 2000e-2, see note 1 supra. 
22. ld. § 2000e-2(e) reads in part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, 
(1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his 
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances 
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular busineBB or enterprise . . . . 
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to how other forms of discrimination may be proved and what 
defenses may be interposed by the defendant. 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., lIS the Supreme Court held that 
facially neutral policies which have a disparate impact on blacks 
violate Title VII regardless of the employers intent, and that 
such practices may only be defended on the grounds that they 
bear a manifest relationship to the employment in question. In 
Griggs, black employees alleged that the employer's use of stan-
dardized intelligence tests and a high school diploma require-
ment had an unlawfully discriminatory impact on Blacks and 
thereby violated Title VII.I. The Court agreed, holding that the 
plaintiff need not prove the employer intended to discriminate, 
and that the congressional intent in enacting Title VII was to 
eliminate employment practices which "operate as 'built-in 
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring 
job capability."1II 
The defendant in Griggs argued that the express language 
of section 703(h) of the Act should be interpreted to require 
proof of an intent to discriminate in testing cases." Rejecting 
this argument, the Court reasoned that Congress' intent was to 
prohibit "not only overt discrimination but also practices that 
are fair in form, but discriminatory in practice."17 The Court 
held "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of show-
ing that any given requirement must have a manifest relation-
ship to the employment in question."11 
Subsequently, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,'· the 
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
24. Id. at 426. 
25. Id. at 432. 
26. Id. at 433. Section 703(h) of the Act reads in pertinent part: 
[Njor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer . . . to give and to act upon the results of any profes-
sionally developed ability test provided that such test, its ad-
ministration or action upon the results is not designed, 
intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, relig-
ion, sex or national origin . . . . 
42. U.S.C. § 200Qe-2(h) (1976). 
27. 401 U.S. at 431. The Court relied upon a memorandum circulated by Senators 
Case and Clark which dealt with the question of whether Title VII mandated the lower-
ing of an employee's qualifications. Id. at 436. 
28. Id. at 432 (Burger, C.J.). 
29. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
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Court refined these theories of the plaintiff's and the defen-
dant's burdens of proof in disparate impact cases. The 'Al-
bemarle plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's employment test-
ing program had a disparate impact on black employees.8o In 
discussing the order· and burden of proof, the Court stated that 
the plaintiffs had made a "prima facie case of discrimination, 
i.e., had shown that the tests [or policies] in question select ap-
plicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly 
different from that of the pool of applicants."11 Once the plain-
tiff has established the prima facie case, the defendant may jus-
tify the practice as a business necessity by showing "that a given 
requirement has a manifest relationship to the employment in 
question."aJ For a defendant to satisfy the business necessity de-
fense in a testing case, the exam must be "shown by profession-
ally acceptable methods, to be predictive of or significantly cor-
related with important elements of work behavior which 
comprise or are relevant to the job for which candidates are be-
ing evaluated."sa If the employer successfully establishes the de-
fense, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that "other tests or 
selection devices, without a similar undesirable. . . effect, would 
also serve the employer's legitimate interest in efficient and 
trustworthy workmanship."14 
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of 
what must be proved to meet the manifest relationship stan-
dard, most courts have adopted the formulation for proof of the 
business necessity defense enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in 
Robinson v. Lorillard. sa Robinson requires the defendant to 
prove that: 
[T]here exists an overriding legitimate business 
purpose such that the practice is necessary to the 
safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, 
the business purpose must be sufficiently compel. 
ling to override any racial impact; the challenged 
practice must effectively carry out the business 
purpose it is alleged to serve .... " 
30. [d. at 409. 
31. [d. at 425. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. at 434. 
34. [d. 
35. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.). cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). 
36. ld. at 798. Most of the circuit courts have adopted this formulation for proving 
49
Kirk et al.: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
74 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:68 
Both the proof of and the defense to allegations that Title 
VII protected groups have intentionally been treated differently 
have taken a wholly different route. The Supreme Court first 
announced the elements and allocation of the burden of proof in 
such cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,S? clarifying it 
most recently in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine.ss To 'prove that a defendant intentionally treated the 
plaintiff differently because of his or her status as a member of a 
group protected under Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that he 
or she: (1) belongs to a group protected by Title VII; (2) applied 
for and was qualified for a job, for which the employer was seek-
ing applicants; (3) was rejected despite the plaintiff's qualifica-
tions; and, (4) after the rejection, the position remained open 
and the employer continued to solicit applications from persons 
of the plaintiff's qualifications.ae Once the plaintiff has made 
this relatively simple showing, an inference of discrimination is 
raised which can be rebutted merely by the defendant "articu-
lating some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason f6r plaintiff's 
rejection."40 If the defendant succeeds in this endeavor, the 
plaintiff then has the heavy burden of proving that the defen-
dant's proferred reason for plaintiff's rejection is a mere pretext 
for discrimination.41 Thus, in contrast to the rigorous business 
the business necessity defense. See Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colo. School Dist., 641 
F.2d 835, 841 (10th Cir. 1981); Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 705 n.6 (8th 
Cir. 1980); Palmer v. General Mills, Inc., 513 F.2d 1040, 1044 (6th Cir. 1975); Muller v. 
United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 
(1975); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 246 (5th Cir. 1974), acq. 
in result 576 F.2d 1157 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); United States v. St. 
Louis·San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir., 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1116 (1973); United States v. International Longshoreman Ass'n, 460 F.2d 497, 504 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 
F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971). 
37. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
38. 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981). 
39. 411 U.S. at S02. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. at 
1094 n.6. In Burdine, the Court said plaintiff's prima facie burden is "not onerous." Id. 
at 1094. 
40. 411 U.S. at 802-03. The presumption of discrimination is rebutted if "the defen-
dant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against 
plaintiff .... The defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admis-
sible evidence, the reasons for plaintiff's rejection." 101 S. Ct. at 1094. "The defendant 
need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proferred reasons." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
41. 411 U.S. at SOl, 804. The Burdine Court articulated two ways in which a plain-
tiff may show pretext: "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory 
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necessity defense to disparate impact cases, the defendant in 
disparate treatment cases has a minimal burden of proving some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection. 
Both disparate· impact and disparate treatment cases in-
volve practices which, on their face, are not violations of Title 
VII. Facial discrimination under Title VII gives rise only to the 
aforesaid statutory BFOQ defense and is never permissible lD 
cases involving racial discrimination.·l.l 
In Dothard v. Robinson,42 the Court found that, although 
the state of Alabama expressly discriminated against women in 
its assignment of correctional counselors to maximum security 
prisons, this practice was justified as a BFOQ.48 The Dothard 
Court, while citing lower court opinions on the burden of proof 
needed to satisfy the BFOQ test,·· held that the BFOQ excep-
tion "provides only the narrowest of exceptions to the general 
rule requiring equality of employment opportunities ... [and] 
that it is impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an indi-
vidual ... 'on the basis of stereotyped characterizations."411 
The Ninth Circuit, in both Harriss and Blake v. City of Los 
Angeles,·' adopted the long accepted formulation of the proof 
element of the business necessity defense in disparate impact 
cases as set out in Robinson. Yet, Ninth Circuit panels in Con-
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's 
proferred explanation is unworthy of credence." 101 S. Ct. at 1095. 
41.1 Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650,652 (5th Cir.), 
cert. den.ied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2e (1976). 
42. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). In addition to the per se discrimination analysis in 
Dothard, the Court found the state's height and weight requirements Cor prison guards 
had a discriminatory impact on women. Id. at 330. The Court then refined the "touch-
stone" language of Griggs to mean "a discriminatory employment practice must be 
shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII chal-
lenge." Id. at 332 n.14. 
43. Id. at 333. For the text of § 2000e-2(e) which provides for the BFOQ defense, see 
note 22 supra. 
44. The Court cited the BFOQ exception as formulated by the Fifth Circuit in Diaz 
v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) and Weeks v. Southern Bell 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). 
45. 433 U.S. at 333. 
46. 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. den.ied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980) (plaintiff 
challenged defendant's height and weight requirements for employment in the city police 
department on the basis of sex discrimination). 
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treras, Craig v. County of Los Angeles"n and deLaurier v. San 
Diego Unified School District48 have adopted a different formu-
lation called the job-relatedness approach. Under this job-relat-
edness approach, the Ninth Circuit has held that the "manifest 
relationship" standard of Griggs is "met with less than proof of 
absolute necessity [by the employer)."·8 This may be one reason 
why the defense is being diluted in the Ninth Circuit. 
C. THE Harriss OPINION 
The Majority 
The Harriss court began by deciding that the defendant's 
stop-work policy was justified as a business necessity.llo The 
court initially found the policy constituted a prima facie viola-
tion of Title VUIiI because flight attendants were barred from 
employment after the notification of pregnancy and for at least 
sixty days after delivery. IIi Nevertheless, the court found that 
the airline's interest in safety overcame any discriminatory im-
47. 626 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1364 (1981). In Craig, 
plaintiff attacked defendant's use of two written examinations and minimum height re-
quirements for employment by the county sheriff's department as discriminating against 
Mexican-Americans. Id. at 661. Holding that a single written examination and the height 
requirement violated Title VII, the Ninth Circuit found no evidence that either the writ-
ten test or the height requirements were job related. Id. at 663. 
48. 588 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1978). In deLaurier, plaintiff challenged defendant's 
policy requiring that she go on leave at the beginning of her ninth month of pregnancy. 
Id. at 675. The Ninth Circuit held that the policy was sufficiently related to the goal of 
educational efficiency. Id. at 680. For an analysis of deLaurier, see 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. 
REV. 39 (1980). 
49. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d at 1276 (quoting deLaurier v. San 
Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d at 678). For excellent discussions of the theoretical 
basis for the business necessity defense, see Comment, The Business Necessity Defense 
to Disparate Impact Liability Under Title Vll, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 926-30 (1976) and 
Note, Business Necessity Under Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alter-
native Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 102, 106 (1974). 
50. 649 F.2d at 676. The district court's opinion in Harriss, 437 F. Supp. 413 (1977), 
is analytically confused. The analysis used by the Harriss trial court mixes the three 
Title VII theories of discrimination, and their defenses. See id. at 430-36. The district 
court held that both the stop· work policy and the start-work policy constituted prima 
facie violations of Title VII, under the theory of disparate treatment. Id. at 425-30. How-
ever, the court held that these policies were justified as either a business necessity or a 
BFOQ. Id. at 432-35. The court further found that the seniority policy did not violate 
Title VII. Id. at 438. The court based its holdings on the possibility of incapacitation, 
due to pregnancy-related illness to flight attendants, the important goal of airline safety, 
and the possibility of a conflict of interest between passenger safety and the protection 
of the flight attendant's unborn child in the case of emergency. Id. at 420-25. 
51. 649 F.2d at 674. 
52. Id. at 672. 
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pact, that pregnancy would possibly affect the ability to perform 
emergency functions and that the risk, discounted by the gravity 
of the harm, justified the airline's policy.&S In finding the stop-
work policy justified, the Ninth Circuit applied the burden of 
proof test enunciated in Blake,&4 which in turn had adopted the 
approach announced in Robinson. 
In considering the defendant's start-work policy under its 
pre-amendment analysis, the Ninth Circuit panel found that the 
policy restricted a pregnant woman's employment opportunities, 
thereby having a discriminatory impact on women in violation of 
Title VIV~II The Harriss court noted that the district court had 
made no findings on either the risk to passengers in allowing 
flight attendants to return to work earlier than sixty days after 
birth" or the necessity of the start-work policy in light of that 
risk.17 The Ninth Circuit remanded Harriss for further factual 
findings as to whether the policy could be justified as a business 
necessity." 
As for the seniority policy, however, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed.II' The district court had determined that Pan Am's se-
niority policy did not violate Title VII. The Ninth Circuit panel 
reasoned that workers who received other medical leaves were 
not penalized by loss of seniority. The court held that the policy 
disproportionately burdened women and constituted a prima fa-
cie violation of Title VII.eo The court then remanded the case 
for further findings as to the business necessity of the policy.81 
53. Id. at 675. 
54. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 928 (1980). 
55. 649 F.2d at 677. 
56.ld. 
57.ld. 
58. Id. at 678. 
69. Id. at 679. 
6O.ld. 
61. Id. In the post-amendment analysis, the Harriss Court concluded that the stop· 
work policy was a per se violation of Title VII but was justified as a BFOQ. rd. at 676. 
The court adopted the formulation of the burden of proof used by the Fifth Circuit in 
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). The Usery Court laid 
down a two-part test in that the employer must show that the BFOQ involved is reason· 
ably neceB881'y to the essence of its business and the employer has a reasonable cause, a 
factual basis, for believing that all or substantially all of the class of people in question 
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved, or that it 
is impossible or impractical to deal with persons on an individual basis. 1d. at 235-36_ 
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The Dissent 
The Harriss dissent attacked the majority for accepting the 
defendant's assertion that passenger safety adequately justified 
its stop-work policy.8lI Because "the airline makes no attempt to 
prevent flight attendants .with other potentially disabling condi-
tions from flying,"es the dissent argued, the stop-work policy ad-
vanced no valid goal of passenger safety and, therefore, was not 
a business necessity.e. The dissent argued that after finding both 
the stop-work and seniority policies violative of Title VII, the 
court should not have remanded for further findings.ell 
Arguing that the start-work policy should be invalidated as 
discriminatory, the dissent stated that there was no "factual ba-
sis for finding that women are unable to perform their duties 
until 60 days after childbirth .... [N]or has the employer 
shown why it does not make individual determinations concern-
ing a woman's ability to return to work before 60 days.''' 
Finally, the dissent argued that the defendant did not "at-
tempt to justify the [seniority policy] as a business necessity.'''' 
In light of the 1978 pregnancy amendment to Title VII,ea the 
remand to the district court is predestined to invalidate the 
policy." 
D. THE Contreras OPINION 
The Majority 
In Contreras,70 the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's 
The Ninth Circuit held that defendant's start-work policy and the seniority policy were 
per se violations of Title VII and remanded the issues to the district court to determine 
whether the policies could be justified as a BFOQ. 649 F.2d at 678-79. 
62. 649 F.2d at 679 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). 
63. Id. at 680. As examples of these physical conditions the dissent cited ulcers, high 
blood pressure, colitis, hernias, and heart disease. Id. 
64.Id. 
65. Id. at 681. At trial, two physicians testified as to when a post-partum examina-
tion should occur to determine when a woman could return to work after delivery. One 
doctor placed the time at 28 days (four weeks), the other at 42 days (six weeks). Id. 
66.Id. 
67.Id. 
68. For pertinent text of the amendment, see note 5 supra. 
69. 649 F.2d at 681. 
70. 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981). The district court's opinion in Contreras may be 
found at 18 Fair Empl. Cas. (BNA) 80 (C.D. Cal. 1977). However, the trial court's opin-
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ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to prove prima facie viola-
tions of Title VII with respect to the senior accountant's exami-
nation.'11 The district court held that statistical evidence of dis-
criminatory impact, "although [showing] disparate [impact], 
[was] not statistically significant when tested at a .05 level of 
significance, "'71 and that, because the plaintiffs had failed to 
study seriously for the examination, they had not proved a 
prima facie case of discrimination. Upholding the lower court 
ruling, the Ninth Circuit said that because of the small sample 
size,'18 and evidence that the plaintiffs had not properly prepared 
for the examination, the district court's ruling against the plain-
tiff was not clearly erroneous under United States v. Yellow Cab 
Co. '7. 
As for the auditor's examination, the appellate court found 
clear error and reversed the district court's determination that 
the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of dis-
criminatory impact.'1I The Ninth Circuit found the district court 
improperly combined the statistics of a separate senior auditor's 
examination with those of the auditor's examination to prove 
there was no disproportionate impact on Spanish surnamed 
applicants. '11 
Consequently, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove 
that the auditor's examination was sufficiently job-related to 
meet the business necessity defense requirements. The Con-
ion is devoid of any reference to the business necessity defense and primarily discusses 
the validation of the two allegedly discriminatory tests for their job· relatedness. 
71. 656 F.2d at 1274. 
72. rd. at 1272. 
73. Only 17 Spanish surnamed applicants took the senior accountant's examination. 
rd. at 1273. 
74. rd. at 1274. "lWlhere the evidence would support a conclusion either way but 
where the triaI court has decided it to weigh more heavily for the defendantl,l ... a 
choice between two permissible views of the weight of evidence is not 'clearly errone· 
ous.''' United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949). 
75. 656 F.2d at 1275. For discussions of the problems of statistical proof in Title VII 
cases, see Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept 
of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1973); Hallock, The Numbers 
Game-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation, 23 VILL. L. REV. 5 
(1977); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law; Statis· 
tical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REv. 387 (1975); Note, Statistics and Title VII 
Proof: Prima Facie Case and Rebuttal, 15 Hous. L. REV. 1030 (1978). 
76. 656 F.2d at 1274-75. 
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treras court found that the defendant had met its burden77 and 
that the plaintiffs failed to prove a less discriminatory alterna-
tive was available to the defendant." 
In constructing a test for the business necessity defense, the 
Contreras court sought to "harmonize the [Ninth Circuit] 
cases. "79 The court found that deLaurier and Craig applied a 
job relatedness standard which "mandate[d] employer color [or 
sex] blindness, but otherwise respects an employer's right to 
seek maximum employee productivity and efficiency."8o In con-
trast, Blake allowed practices or tests only when it can be 
proved that not allowing these devices would seriously injure the 
defendant.81 To resolve the dispute, the Contreras court ana-
lyzed the same legislative pronouncements analyzed by the Su-
preme Court in Griggs. 81 
The Contreras court found that "the legislative history of 
Title VII clearly reveals that Congress was concerned about pre-
serving employer freedom, and that it acted to mandate em-
ployer color [or sex] blindness with as little intrusion into the 
free enterprise system as possible."ea Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the less restrictive burden of proof required by 
Craig and deLaurier is the appropriate test for business neces-
sity.84 For further support, the Ninth Circuit panel cited New 
York Transit Authority v. Beaze,.ae and Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine.88 In Beazer, the Supreme Court 
held that the defendant's policy of denying employment to 
methadone87 users was not racially discriminatory under Title 
VII. 88 After finding that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient 
evidence of disparate impact to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination,89 the Court reasoned that even if a prima facie 
77. Id. at 1284. 
78. Id. at 1285. 
79. Id. at 1277. 
SO.Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 1277·78. 
83. Id. at 1278. 
84.Id. 
85. 440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
86. 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981). 
87. "Methadone" is used to treat heroin addiction. 440 U.S. at 573. 
88. Id. at 587. 
89. Id. at 584·87. 
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case was established, the policy could be justified as a business 
necessity on the basis that "the [policy] bears a manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question."90 The Contreras court 
then held that the defendant's process for validating its exami-
nation met the Albemarle standard91 as to whether examinations 
are a business necessity and that the plaintiffs had not shown 
the existence of a less discriminatory alternative.1II 
The Dissent 
The di~sent, while concurring in the result in Contreras, 
disagreed with the panel's assertion that an intracircuit split for 
the burden of proof for the business necessity defense existed.98 
Attacking the majority, the dissent argued that the Blake court 
implicitly followed the Ninth Circuit decisions in Craig and de-
Laurier because it deleted the phrase "necessity connotes an· ir-
resistible demand .... [A practice] must not only directly fos-
ter safety and efficiency . . . but must also be essential to those 
goals."M Because the Blake court did not define necessity as be-
ing irresistible, as do other circuit courts, the dissent concluded 
that Blake was consistent with Craig and deLaurier. ell 
In addition, the dissent argued that if Blake had required 
proof that the employment practice was absolutely necessary to 
the business purpose, it would shift the plaintifrs burden of 
proving the availability of a less discriminatory alternative into 
the defendant's business necessity defense." This shift in bur-
den, the dissent maintained, would be contrary to the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Dothard9'1 and Albemarle Paper." The dis-
sent contended that "(1) ... the 'necessity' language in 
Dothard excludes consideration of less discriminatory alterna-
tives as part of the employer's proof; and (2) any discussion of 
alternatives during judicial review of the employer's burden of 
proof centers on more efficient alternatives, and not, necessarily, 
90. [d. at 587 n.31. 
91. 422 U.S. at 431. 
92. 656 F.2d at 1284-85. 
93. [d. at 1286 (Tang, J., dissenting). 
94. [d. at 1289 (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 
(2d Cir. 1971». 
95. 656 F.2d at 1290. 
96. [d. 
97. See notes 42·45 supra and accompanying text. 
98. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. 
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on less discriminatory alternatives."911 Finally, the dissent argued 
that because "the district court committed legal error by requir-
ing [defendant to] supply 'competent and relevant evidence' on 
the issue of the job relatedness of their employment standard, 
. . . [he] would remand the case with instructions to reevaluate 
the evidence under the proper legal standard."loo The dissent 
reasoned that because of the district court's erroneous concept 
of the law, the clearly erroneous standard should not be used. 
E. ANALYSIS 
The conflict within the Ninth Circuit over the proper for-
mulation of the burden of proof for the business necessity de-
fense should be resolved in favor of the Robinson standard,lol 
developed in the Fourth Circuit and adopted by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Harriss lO" and Blake. loa This burden of proof standard is 
consistent with congressional intent and the Supreme Court 
opinions in Griggs, Albermarle, and Dothard. 
In the legislative debates accompanying the enactment of 
Title VII, the intent of Congress was to allow efficient business 
policies to continue, and to balance this policy with the goal of 
equal employment opportunity. 11M Cases which had adopted the 
Robinson approach have balanced these goals. loa These cases 
strike down the employment practice only if (1) the practice is 
not related to job performancel" or (2) an alternative policy ex-
ists, without the discriminatory impact, which serves the busi-
ness policy better or equally as well.1o'J 
99. 656 F.2d at 1291. This argument seema whimsical in light of the Supreme 
Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. II. Green, discuaaed at text accompanying 
notes 37·41 supra. 
100. 656 F.2d at 1293-94. 
101. For a discussion of the Robinson standard, see notes 35-36 supra and accompa-
nying text. 
102. 649 F.2d at 670. 
103. 595 F.2d at 1376. 
104. Congress expressly considered the court's decision in Griggs, and clearly ap-
proved the decision, indicating that the Court's focus on the predictiveness of a business 
policy to job performance was correct. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st· Sess. 8, 21 
(1971); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971); 177 CONGo REC. (1971) (re~arks 
of Rep. Perkins). 
105. For a list of cases adopting the Robinson approach, see note 36 supra. 
106. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
107. See notes 112·117 infra and accompanying text. 
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The job-relatedness approach does not balance these legisla-
tive goals. In Contreras, the court held that "discriminatory 
tests are impermissible unless shown by professionally accepted 
method, to be predictive of, or significantly correlated with im-
portant elements of work behavior ... to the job for which can-
didates are being evaluated.mo8 This formulation of the burden 
of proof tolerates a disparate impact on protected individuals 
even though other job-related policies are at least as efficient as 
the challenged policy. The job-related policy does not carry out 
the balancing mandated by Congress.10e 
The Contreras court's reliance on dictum in Beazer is mis-
placed. Beazer involved drug use, the effects of which on an in-
dividual cannot readily be determined by tests which may be 
given by an employer. The plaintiff in Beazer failed to show that 
a feasible alternative was available to the defendant and is not a 
case which adopts the job-relatedness approach to the business 
necessity defense. 
In trying to further support its interpretation of Title VII, 
the Contreras court unfortunately cited the Supreme Court's 
Burdine decision. Burdine involved allegations of discrimination 
through disparate treatment, while Contreras dealt with em-
ployment practices which allegedly have a disparate impact on 
groups protected by Title VII. As noted earlier, these two theo-
ries are not sufficiently analogous to lend support to each 
other. no Because of this incompatibility with the congressional 
intent of Title VII, the Contreras formulation of the burden of 
proof for the business necessity defense should be rejected. 
The Harriss court adopted the correct formulation for the 
business necessity defense and then misapplied the standard. In 
Harriss, the court ignored the final portion of the Robinson 
standard. 111 
For example, in Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,UI the 
108. 656 F.2d at 1332. 
109. See text accompanying note 104 supra. 
110. See notes 23-41 supra and accompanying text. 
111. For a discussion of the Robinson standard, see notes 35-36 supra and accompa-
nying text. 
112. 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). 
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Fourth Circuit faced a situation analogous to that in Harriss. 
The Burwell court, in a per curiam opinion, found that Eastern's 
policy of requiring pregnant flight attendants to take maternity 
leave immediately upon learning of the pregnancy was not a 
business necessity during the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy. 
To reach this conclusion, the Burwell court relied on essentially 
the same medical evidence as did the Harriss panel. ll8 The 
Burwell court concluded that the defendant had not met its bur-
den of proof under Robinson. Consequently, Burwell holds that 
the mandatory leave policy is justified from the fourteenth week 
of pregnancy until the birth of the child.114 The dissent11ll argued 
that the plaintiff had rebutted the existence of the business ne-
cessity defense when she showed that defendant had an alterna-
tive business practice available, which accomplished the business 
purpose equally as well. lie The dissent urged that the lower 
court ruling, which stated that a business necessity did not exist 
until after the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, was supported 
by the evidence and should not be reversed.ll7 
Burwell presents two less onerous alternative policies to the 
harsh result in Harriss. Both the thirteenth week and the 
twenty-eighth week stopping point for flight attendants would 
serve the health and safety concerns of the businesses involved 
without the detrimental economic impact an immediate "stop-
work" has on flight attendants and their families. 
If there is a trend emerging from Harriss and Contreras, it 
may be that the Ninth Circuit is willing to defer to the policies 
113. The court noted that many of the experts who testified in Burwell have testi-
fied in similar cases. [d. at 367. 
114. [d. at 372. 
115. [d. at 373 (Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting). 
116. [d. at 375. 
117. Northwest Airlines permits flight attendants to work until the 28th week of 
pregnancy upon medical certification of their ability to work. [d. at 376. Subsequently, 
Eastern Airlines adopted the same policy after the district court's decision in Burwell. 
The partial dissent also noted that Eastern allows flight attendants, with the supervision 
of their medical department, to fly with controlled diabetes and epilepsy, even though 
medical experts at trial testified that the conditions were "more likely to be disabling 
than pregnancy." [d. Finally, the dissent said that defendant's "normal method of han-
dling physical and mental disabilities, other than pregnancy, is to rely upon self-monitor-
ing." [d. 
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of organizations which have a strong concern for safety. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit has not, after twelve years of litigation, 
settled on a standard for the business necessity defense. The 
Harriss and Blake courts have adopted the correct Robinson 
formulation for the business necessity defense. However, the 
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Harriss and Contreras shows how 
easily Title VII is misinterpreted and misapplied. These mis-
takes make it easier for employers to discriminate freely without 
facing the consequences. Without stronger direction from the 
Supreme Court in the area of the business necessity defense, the 
intent of Title VII will never fully be achieved. 
James D. Fisher 
IV. ESCHEWING THE FAT: FLIGHT ATTENDANT 
WEIGHT REQUIREMENTS AND TITLE VII 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Gerdom u. Continental Airlines, Inc.,! the Ninth Circuit 
held that (1) the airlines' weight requirements for flight attend-
ants do not constitute unlawful sex discrimination under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Action the theory of disparate impact on 
women; (2) remand was appropriate to allow plaintiffs an oppor-
tunity to establish a violation under the disparate treatment 
theory; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in refus-
ing to certify the class action. 
Until 1973, defendant Continental Airlines hired only 
female flight attendants and required them to maintain their 
weight below the maximum limits published in a height/weight 
charlo In 1973, the defendant began hiring a limited number of 
men as flight attendants. 8 Continental also modified its weight 
1. 648 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were 
Soloman, D.J., sitting by designation; and Schroeder, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
2. Subchapter VI of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701.718, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). 
3. The airlines' change in hiring policy resulted from the Fifth Circuit decision in 
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 
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requirements so that flight attendants would maintain their 
weight in a reasonable relationship to their height, bone struc-
ture and age.4 
Plaintiff Gerdom, a female flight attendant, was terminated 
in 1971 for exceeding her maximum weight." She sued Continen-
tal and the Air Line Pilots' Association (the Association) in 1972 
claiming unlawful sex discrimination. The court dismissed the 
suit against the Association in 1973. The Association then sued 
Continental on behalf of flight attendants suspended or termi-
nated for exceeding the weight limits.· The two suits were con-
solidated and, in 1977, the Union of Flight Attendants became 
the bargaining representative for the affected employees andre-
placed the Association as a plaintiff.7 The plaintiffs challenged 
both the pre-1973 and post-1973 weight requirements. 
The trial court granted the defendant's summary judgment 
motion and the plaintiffs appealed.8 The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the lower court's finding that the airline's weight requirements 
had no adverse impact on women, but remanded the case to the 
trial court to determine the issue of disparate treatment which 
the lower court had failed to address. It also reversed the trial 
court's denial of plaintiff's motion to certify a class. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Section 703(a) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (the Act) pros-
cribes employment discharges based on an individual's sex.' The 
(1971). Diaz held that a policy of hiring only women as flight attendants was not a bona 
fide occupational qualification and violated Title VII. Id. at 388-89. Men presently re-
main a small minority in this job category. As of 1974, only two percent of Continental's 
flight attendants were men. 648 F.2d at 1225. 
4. 648 F.2d at 1225. 
5. Gerdom was terminated March 22, 1971 because she exceeded her maximum 
weight for 90 days. She was 5' 5W' tall and weighed 146'h pounds-13 pounds above 
her allowed maximum. She had previously been suspended eight times without pay for 
exceeding her maximum weight requirement. Id. 
6.Id. 
7.Id. 
8. Gerdom v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 6051 (C.D. 
Cal. 1976). 
9. Section 703(a) of the Act provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex .... n 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a) (1976). 
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primary purpose of the Act is to insure equality of employment 
opportunities and to eliminate racial barriers.lO The legislative 
history accompanying the amendment adding "sex" to Title VII 
is meager at best. The sex discrimination provisions were added 
to the Act only one day before the House approved Title VIIu 
and was offered as a floor amendment without any prior legisla-
tive hearing or debate. The limited floor discussion lasted only 
an hour and added little substance to clarify the intended scope 
of the amendment. 11 Ironically, Representative Howard Smith of 
Virginia, an outspoken opponent of the Act, introduced the 
amendment and was later accused by one commentator of trying 
to sabotage the Act by his proposal.18 
Because of the scant history, some courts have inferred that 
Congress did n9t intend the ban on sex discrimination to have 
"significant and sweeping implications. "14 However, attempts to 
modify Title VII by including age as an impermissible employ-
ment factorlll and to weaken the sex amendment by prohibiting 
only discrimination based "solely" on sex have failed.18 By the 
time of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,1'f Con-
gress made clear that it intended to fight sex discrimination as 
vigorously as other prohibited forms of discrimination. IS 
10. "The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the lan· 
guage of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove 
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an jdentifiable group of white employees 
over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429·30 (1971). 
11. Willingham v. Macon Tel Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); 
Binder, Sex Discriminaton in the Airline Industry: Title VII Flying High, 59 CALIP. L. 
REv. 1091, 1092·93 (1971); DelJelopments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and 
Title VII of the CilJil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1167 (1971); Comment, 
Flights Attendant Weight Requirements and Title VII of the CilJil Rights Act of 1964, 
45 J. AIR L. & COM. 483, 485 (1980). 
12. Comment, supra note 11, at 485. 
13.ld. 
14. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
15. Comment, supra note 11, at 486 n.11. 
16. Id. n.12. 
17. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 
(1976» (amending the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
18. See Comment, supra note 11, at 486 n.1S. The Report of the House Generai 
Sub-Committee on Labor stated: 
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class. 
Their self-fulfillment and development is frustrated because of 
their sex .... 
Such blatantly disparate treatment is particularly objec-
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Two legal theories may support a plaintiff's Title VII claim: 
disparate impact and disparate treatment.le Each theory dic-
tates a different method of proof. 
Disparate Impact Theory 
Disparate impact, also known as adverse impact, focuses on 
the consequences of the alleged discriminatory employment 
practice. The leading case, Griggs u. Duke Power CO.,IO involved 
the use of educational and intellectual employment require-
ments which excluded more blacks than whites from certain job 
categories. Because the requirements were neither job-related 
nor necessary for success in the positions being filled,ll the 
Griggs Court found the employment criteria racially discrimina-
tory. The Court held that job qualifications "must have a mani-
fest· relationship to the employment in question"SS and "must 
measure the person for the job and not the person in the 
abstract. "sa 
Whereas Griggs concerned racial discrimination under Title 
VII, Dothard u. Rawlinsonl • involved height and weight require-
ments for women employees in the Alabama prison system. The 
requirements excluded forty percent of the female population 
but only one percent of the male population from positions in 
the prison system. The Court found the requirements violated 
Title VII in those circumstances where they excluded women 
from certain jobs not involving direct contact with male 
prisoners. III 
tionable in view of the fact that Title VII has specifically pro· 
hibited sex discrimination since its enactment in 1964 .... 
. .. [D)iscrimination against women continues to be 
widespread, and is regarded by many as either morally or 
physiologically justifiable. 
H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE CONGo &: AD. 
NEWS 2140-41. 
19. Golden V. Local 55, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 633 F.2d 817, 820-21 (9th Cir. 
1980); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw, 1153-54, 1158 
(1976). A third theory, present effects of past discrimination, will not be discussed since 
only the first two theories were at issue in Gerdom. 
20. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
21. ld. at 429-33. 
22. ld. at 432. 
23. ld. at 436. 
24. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
25. ld. at 331-32. 
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Both decisions illustrate that, under the disparate impact 
theory, a plaintiff need only show that facially neutral standards 
actually result in a significantly discriminatory pattern of hiring 
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden 
then shifts to the employer to show that the requirement mani-
festly relates to the employment. Ie If the employer meets this 
burden, the plaintiff must then show that other selection criteria 
would serve the employer's legitimate business needs without 
the discriminatory impact.17 Because courts focus on the conse-
quences of the employment practice, they do not require proof 
of discriminatory intent, only discriminatory effect.s8 
Flight attendants have unsuccessfully challenged airline 
weight requirements under the disparate impact theory.se In 
Dothard, the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of sex dis-
crimination because the Alabama prison system's combined 
height and weight restrictions excluded 41.13% of the female 
population but less than 1 % of the male population. ao Flight at-
tendants have had a difficult time proving statistically any dis-
parate impact of the weight requirements. In Jarrell v. Eastern 
Airlines, Inc.,81 weight limits which differed for male and female 
flight attendants would admit only 33.3 % of the general female 
population and 43.5 % of the general male population. The court 
held these statistical differences insufficient to establish prima 
facie evidence of disparate impact.as Present airline weight re-
quirements are close to these ratios. aa Therefore, a statistical ap-
proach to proving the disparate impact of airline weight require-
ments would likely fail. 
26. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432. 
27. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
28. "Title VII is not concerned with the employer's 'good intent or absence of dis-
criminatory intent' for 'Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of 
employment practices, not simply the motivation.''' Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U.S. 405, 422 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432). 
29. Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Janel v. 
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 
1978); COl[ v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 4962 (S.D. Fla. 1976), 
aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977). 
30. 433 U.S. at 329-30. 
31. 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978). 
32. Id. at 889-90. This conclusion was reaffirmed in Leonard v. National Airlines, 
Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269, 275 (S.D. Fla. 1977) where only 22% of the female population 
would meet the weight standards as opposed to 30% of the male population. 
33. See Comment, supra note 11. at 492-94. 
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Jarrell further supported the courts' reluctance to find dis-
parate impact in flight attendant cases. Because the flight at-
tendant is an overwhelmingly female-dominated job classifica-
tion, the airlines' weight and other restrictions have not barred 
employment opportunities for women.14 If anything, the recent 
past has been marked by sex discrimination against males,11 and 
male flight attendants remain a minority. Therefore, some courts 
refuse to find that employment requirements discriminate 
against women in occupations where only women are employed. 
For example, in Stroud v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,ae the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that where only women occupy positions as flight at-
tendants, a no-marriage rule of the employer does not discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex. 
Courts have also looked upon the airlines' weight require-
ments as a part of an overall grooming program or personal ap-
pearance policy," allowing the employer to impose reasonable 
personal appearance requirements on its employees. The stan-
dards may also differ between male and female employees." 
However, grooming standards which distinguish between men 
and women on the basis of "immutable characteristics" or "fun-
damental rights" do violate Title VII.I' 
The Ninth Circuit in Baker v. California Land Title CO.40 
34. Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884, 892-93 (E.D. Va. 1977), off'd, 
577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978). . 
35. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
36. 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977). 
37. Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884, 891-92 (E.D. Va. 1977), off'd, 
577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978). 
38. "There is virtual unanimity among the Circuit Courts or Appeals that an em-
ployer may impose reasonable personal appearance requirements upon its employees and 
such standards need not be identical for· males and females. Such practices are said to be 
non-sexually discriminating." rd. at 891. See 0"0 Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing 
Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975). 
39. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975). 
See also Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 
1976): 
[D)iscrimination based on either immutable 88X characteristics 
or constitutionally protected activities such as marriage or 
child rearing violate [Title VII) because they present obstacles 
to employment of one 88X that cannot be overcome. On the 
other hand, discrimination based on factors of personal prefer-
ence does not necessarily restrict employment opportunities 
and thus is not forbidden. 
40. 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975). 
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found hair length restrictions for male employees not discrimi-
natory within the meaning of Title VII because hair length was 
not an immutable characteristic.n Baker was followed by the 
Fifth Circuit's decision in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Pub-
lishing CO.,41 which reB.ects the present state of the law on 
grooming standards. The employer in Willingham refused to 
hire an applicant because of his shoulder length hair. The Fifth 
Circuit concluded that Congress intended equal employment op-
portunity could best be secured by prohibiting employers from 
discriminating between men and women on the basis of immuta-
ble characteristics or fundamental rights. U The court found hair 
length neither immutable nor constitutionally protected44 and 
that such grooming codes reflected the employer's right to con-
trol his or her business rather than a denial of equal 
opportunity.411 
Except for Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,4e courts have 
upheld flight attendant weight requirements on the grounds that 
weight is neither an immutable characteristic nor a fundamental 
right.4' In Laffey, decided prior to Willingham, the airlines 
hired male pursers whose jobs, for purposes of Title VII, were 
substantially equal and similarly situated to those of female 
flight attendants. The airlines, however, paid pursers higher sal-
aries, allowed them more expensive layover accommodations, 
provided an allowance to maintain their uniforms, and did not 
41. Id. at 897. 
42. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975). 
43. Id. at 1091. 
44.1d. 
45.1d. 
46. 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
47. In Cox v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 4962 (S.D. Fla. 1976), 
aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977), a female flight attendant claimed she was unable 
to reduce her weight to the employer's allowable maximum because of inherent female 
characteristics. The court analogized these weight restrictions to hair length restrictions 
and held that Title VII does not protect classifications which result from grooming stan-
dards. Id. at 4963. In Jarrell, the court held that the airlines' weight program did not 
violate Title VII by relying, in part, on the hair length cases. The court held that weight, 
like hair, is a characteristic subject to the reasonable control of most individuals. 430 F. 
Supp. at 892. In Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977), the 
court upheld defendant's weight policy citing Willingham, Jarrell and COl:. Id. at 275. It 
noted that Title VII is not intended to interfere with an employer's right to determine 
how best to run his or her business. It held that weight is not an impermissible classifica-
tion under Title VII because it is not immutable. Id. 
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subject them to weight restrictions.·' The District of Columbia 
Circuit found that the weight program was only one aspect of a 
broad range of unequal treatment between the male pursers and 
female flight attendants and held that the weight requirement 
violated Title VII. 
Disparate Treatment Theory 
The disparate treatment theory of discrimination is what 
Congress contemplated when it passed Title VII.·' It concerns 
treating similarly situatedllO individuals differently because of 
their race, sex, national origin or other prohibited criteria. 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,II1 the Supreme Court 
set out an order of proof for disparate treatment allegations. III In 
McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that the complainant in a 
Title VII action carries the initial burden under the statute to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. III Complainant 
Green alleged racial discrimination as the reason the corporation 
refused to rehire him. He was able to establish prima facie dis-
crimination by showing that: (1) he belonged to a racial minor-
ity; (2) he applied and was qualified for a job for which the cor-
poration was seeking applicants; (3) despite his qualifications, he 
was rejected; and, (4) after his rejection, the position remained 
open and the corporation continued seeking applications from 
persons with similar qualifications. &4 
If the complainant establishes prima facie discrimination, 
the burden shifts to the employer corporation "to articulate 
some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employer's 
rejection."11 In McDonnell Douglas, the corporation pointed to 
complainant's past unlawful conduct against the corporation to 
justify its refusal to rehire him. Such a showing sufficiently re-
buts the prima facie case and shifts the burden to the complain-
48. 567 F.2d at 454. 
49. See B. SCHLE! & P. GROSSMAN, Bupra note 19, at 15. 
50. Id. at 16·17. 
51. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
52. Although McDonnell Douglas addressed a private noncl888 action brought under 
the disparate treatment theory, class actions would follow the same order and allocation 
of proof. See B. SCRLE! & P. GROSSMAN. Bupra note 19, at 1157. 
53. 411 U.S. at 802. 
54.Id. 
55.Id. 
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ant to show that the employer's justification was pretextual. The 
Court listed ways the complainant could meet this burden: He 
could show that white employees engaged in the same activity 
were retained or rehired, or he could present evidence of the cor-
poration's treatment of him during his prior employment, the 
corporation's reaction to his civil rights activities, or of the cor-
poration's general policy and practice regarding minority 
employment. " 
McDonnell Douglas articulated the three-step analysis that 
courts presently apply to Title VII cases brought under the dis-
parate treatment theory. Later decisions have clarified and re-
fined that analysis. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation 
Co.,'" the Supreme Court interpreted McDonnell Douglas as re-
quiring a showing that "race was a 'but for' cause" but not a 
showing that race was the sole cause of the adverse action." In 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,'9 the Supreme Court re-
jected the lower court's holding that in addition to showing a 
legitimate purpose behind its hiring methods, the employer 
must show those methods will allow consideration of the largest 
number of minority applicants.eo The Court found that Title VII 
does not impose a duty on the employer to adopt a hiring proce-
dure which maximizes hiring minority employees.e1 In Board of 
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney,el the Supreme 
Court clarified the meaning of "articulating" a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for an employment practice. The Court 
said this did not mean that the employer must "prove absence 
of discriminatory motive''61 to meet its burden under Title VII. 
Applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis to sex discrimi-
nation claims, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that 
persons of one sex are treated differently from similarly situated 
persons of the opposite sex and that no adequate explanation 
exists for the different treatment." While the plaintiff retains 
56. [d. at 804-05. 
57. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
58. [d. at 282 n.10. 
59. 438 U.S. at 567 (1978). 
60. [d. at 576·77. 
61. [d. at 577-78. 
62. 439 U.S. 24 (1978). 
63. [d. at 25. 
64. Golden v. Local 55, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 633 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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the burden of persuasion, the burden of production shifts to the 
defendant employer to advance its reasons for treating male and 
female employees differently. The plaintiff must then show that 
the reasons were pretextual and that sex discrimination moti-
vated the employment practice. Unlike disparate impact, the 
disparate treatment theory of Title VII requires proof of intent. 
The court will focus its inquiry on whether the employer pre-
mised the employment practices on sex. The motivation and in-
tent of the employer will determine whether the articulated rea-
sons for disparate treatment were pretextual. ell 
In Laffey, the District of Columbia Circuit defined the stan-
dard for intent. e. The plaintiff in Laffey was a flight attendant 
who alleged sex discrimination under the disparate treatment 
theory. The employer admitted discriminatory treatment of 
female flight attendants vis-a-vis male pursers and that the dis-
parate treatment was based on sex, but defended its conduct as 
unintentional. The court found that the Act requires only "a 
general intent to discriminate" and "prohibits any discrimina-
tory practice which was not merely accidental.'''' If" 'the defen-
dant meant to do what he did'-there is no burden to show ad-
ditional discriminatory motivation in order to recover under 
Title VII."88 
In Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.," a stewardess con-
tested, under the disparate treatment theory, the airline's no-
marriage rule because the rule did not apply to male stewards. 
The court held that the rule did not constitute a bona fide occu-
pational qualification (BFOQ) under section 703(e)(1) of the Act 
and found for the plaintiff.'o The court noted that even if only 
women occupied the position, the employer could not impose ad-
ditional qualifications not imposed upon male employees unless 
"that requirement reflects an inherent quality reasonably neces-
65. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1976); McDonnell Doug· 
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 
1163·54. 
66. 667 F.2d at 454·66. 
67. 1d. (citing Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkera v. United States, 416 
F.2d 980, 995·97 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970)). 
68. 567 F.2d at 455 (quoting Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. 
United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970)). 
69. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971). 
70. 1d. at 1199. 
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sary to satisfactory performance of the duties of stewardesses 
"71 
In summary, plaintiffs in flight attendant cases have argued 
sex discrimination under the disparate impact and disparate 
treatment theories. The disparate impact theory is less difficult 
for a plaintiff to prove upon showing a prima facie case. No evi-
dence need be presented regarding the employer's intent. How-
ever, case history indicates that courts have largely disfavored 
this theory in challenges to flight attendant weight require-
ments. Courts are more receptive to arguments against weight 
requirements under the disparate treatment theory which re-
quires the plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent. 
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Majority 
The GerdoTn plaintiffs alleged sex discrimination under both 
disparte impact and disparate treatment theories. The majority 
first considered the plaint~s arguments that the airlines' 
weight policy adversely affected women under the Griggs and 
Dothard rationale and found the two cases inapplicable since 
defendant's weight requirements did not exclude women as a 
class from flight attendant positions. The majority referred to 
Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 'II because, prior to 1972, the 
weight policy did not restrict employment opportunities for wo-
. men inasmuch as only women were hired. The Gerdom court 
stated that some women were excluded, but only on the basis of 
weight.'III Because the plaintiffs did not allege that the airlines 
enforced the requirements more strictly against female flight at-
tendants than against male flight attendants, the majority af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of the adverse impact 
laim '74 C • 
The majority then turned to the disparate treatment allega-
tion. The court noted that the airline could impose weight stan-
dards on its employees with different requirements for men and 
71.Id. 
72. 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cit.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977). 
73. 648 F.2d at 1226. 
74. Id. at 1227. 
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women, and relied on Baker v. California Land Title Co.,n a 
grooming standards case. The Gerdom court also referred to the 
decisions of other circuits which have reflected challenges to air-
line weight requirements to support its position. 'ut 
The plaintiffs alleged that the director of passenger services 
(DPS) and flight attendant positions were similarly situated. 
They pointed out that DPS was a predominantly male position 
subject to more lenient weight requirements which were more 
leniently enforced than were those for flight attendants. Plain-
tiffs argued that DPSs, like flight attendants, were inflight per-
sonnel, were exposed to a great amount of public contact, and 
often performed flight attendant duties."" The defendant argued 
that the positions differed in the amount of public contact in-
volved and functions performed.'78 The majority concluded that 
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case that the DPS posi-
tion was similar to that of the flight attendant, that one was 
predominantly male and the other predominantly female, and 
that the weight requirements for the jobs differed.TtI However, 
because the district court failed to consider the plaintiffs' dispa-
rate treatment argument, the majority remanded the case so 
that the lower court could resolve the remaining factual issues. 
The majority instructed the lower court to determine whether 
the duties between the two positions were so similar as to dis-
credit any reason for disparate treatment in their weight 
requirements.IO 
The Dissent 
Initially, the dissent agreed that the plaintiffs had shown a 
prima facie case of discrimination.11 The dissent, however, dis-
agreed with the majority's decision to remand the disparate 
75. 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cu. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975). 
76. 648 F.2d at 1227. The majority also reversed the district court on the issue of 
class certification. It found that the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to cer-
tify a class of flight attendants who had been terminated or lIuspended for violating de-
fendant's weight requirement. Id. at 1228. This issue was not in controversy and will not 
be discussed further in this Note. 
77. Id. at 1227. 
78. Id. at 1227·28. The defendant also contended that DPS was a management posi-
tion while flight attendant was not. 
79. Id. at 1228. 
SO.ld. 
81. ld. at 1229 (Schroeder, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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treatment issue because the defendant had had ample opportu-
nity to justify its weight policy and the litigation was already too 
protracted.82 Second, the dissent disagreed with the majority's 
approval of Stroud, a decision which the dissent found need-
lessly burdens the plaintiff who works in a segregated job.88 
The dissent pointed out that the defendant imposed weight 
requirements on women but not on men, even though both 
served passengers during flights. As a result, women faced em-
barrassing weigh-ins, debilitating diets and reprisals for at-
tempting to file suit. The dissent stated the weight requirements 
bore no relation to ability to perform as a flight attendant and 
that the airlines took no disciplinary action against male flight 
attendants who exceeded their weight limits.·· 
The dissent rejected the notion that the airlines imposed 
functionally similar grooming requirements on both men and 
women, as was the case in Baker.1I The dissent criticized the 
defendant's justifications for its weight policy. The defendant 
asserted that the weight policy was a business judgment which 
furthered the corporate image. Men were exempted because they 
would advance to management rather than service positions. 
The dissent believed the defendant's explanation served only to 
highlight its discriminatory practices." 
According to the dissent, the airline industry has histori-
cally exploited female sex appeal and discriminated against wo-
men on the basis of sex. The dissent pointed to such past dis-
criminatory practices against female flight attendants as 
mandatory retirement at age thirty-two or thirty-five and the 
no-marriage rule.87 Such a history of discrimination made sus-
pect any business necessity argument raised by the employer." 
The dissent also took issue with the majority's conclusion 
that the weight restrictionS did not adversely affect women. In 
effect, the majority found the suspension or termination of em-
82. Id. at 1229-30. 
83. Id. at 1229. 
84.Id. 
85.Id. 
86.Id. 
87.Id. 
88.Id. 
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ployment was not adverse.89 The dissent pointed out that the 
Stroud approach would only preclude plaintiffs in segregated job 
classifications from proving a prima facie case of discrimination. 
To prevent such a harsh result, the dissent proposed a new the-
ory: Whenever an employment requirement is applied to a segre-
gated job classification and not to other employees, a prima facie 
finding of discrimination should be found under either disparate 
treatment or disparate impact analysis." The dissent then 
adopted the rationale of the Sprogis' l court that if the employer 
imposed an additional qualification upon one sex, that require-
ment would be valid only if it was reasonably necessary to per-
form the duties of the position in question.1I Under this pro-
posed theory, the dissent believed the plaintiffs had proved their 
case. 
D. CRITIQUE 
Based on case law, the majority's decision to affirm the dis-
missal of plaintiffs' disparate impact claim was correct. While 
the dissent took issue with this point, there is little to support 
that position. 
The majority mentioned the Fifth Circuit's Stroud decision 
in its opinion, although the disposition of the case shows less 
than a wholehearted approval of Stroud. By considering the dis-
parate treatment claim, the Ninth Circuit has departed from 
Stroud. The Stroud court ignored that aspect of the case before 
it. Although there were no male flight attendants while Stroud 
was employed, men in other job classes were excluded from the 
marriage restriction. Yet, the court ignored this disparate treat-
ment issue in its decision and held simply that because no men 
were in the flight attendant field, no barrier to women's employ-
ment existed. Therefore, the discrimination was based on mari-
tal status, not sex. On the other hand, the Gerdom court looked 
to the fact that men in other job classes, specifically the DPS, 
were excluded from the employer's weight requirements. There-
89. [d. at 1230. 
90. [d. 
91. 444 F.2d at 1194. 
92. [d. at 1199. 
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fore, the Gerdom plaintiffs will be allowed the opportunity to 
prove their case under this theory, which the plaintiff in Stroud 
was not. 
The dissent's criticism of Stroud is well taken in one other 
respect. The Stroud court ignored the fact that the right to mar-
riage is a fundamental right. Under the grooming standards 
cases, such as the Fifth's Circuit's Willingham decision, the re-
striction against marriage presents a likely violation of Title VII 
which the Gerdom court failed to address. 
The dissent raised a valid point which, fortunately, the 
Ninth Circuit was not forced to face in this case. Employees in 
segregated jobs where the employer imposes an unlawful em-
ployment restriction will find it almost impossible to present a 
prima facie case of discrimination under the present theoretical 
framework. of Title VII. Their claims will not fit the disparate 
impact theory, in part because they will be unable to show a 
barrier to employment opportunities. Nor will their claims fit 
the disparate treatment theory because they will be unable to 
point to others similarly situated who are not similarly treated. 
As the dissent warned, the unfortunate effect could be to moti-
vate the employer to segregate the work force. The dissent has 
suggested an inviting standard to resolve such a dilemma: 
Whenever an employer applies a rule only to employees in a sex-
segregated job classification, a prima facie case of discrimination 
has been shown. To date, no court has adopted this standard. 
Although the dissent pointed to Sprogis to illustrate a case using 
this standard, the Sprogis court decided that dispute under the 
disparate treatment theory. In Sprogis, similarly situated men 
and women were treated differently because of their gender. 
Furthermore, the Sprogis court dealt with an issue affecting a 
fundamental right-the right of marriage. 
In sum, the majority's decision agrees with the present state 
of the law on flight attendant weight restriction and may even 
be more liberal in terms of considering issues that other courts 
have ignored. The dissent may point the way for a new standard 
or theory under Title VII which would resolve the dilemma 
where segregated classes exist and suffer discriminatory prac-
tices, but are unable to establish prima facie cases within the 
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present theoretical framework of Title VII. 
Jacqueline Martinez 
V. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
In other cases decided by the Ninth Circuit, the court re-
fused to disturb a Naval regulation which provides for discharge 
solely on a person's sexual preference, required that verdicts 
from a bench trial be facially consistent, and allowed commercial 
pilots with a prior history of alcholism to qualify to fly. 
A. HOMOSEXUAL DISCRIMINATION UPHELD 
In Beller v. Middendorf,} the Ninth Circuit upheld Navy 
regulations which discharge persons solely on the basis of homo-
sexual activity.' When confronted with evidence gathered by the 
military, plaintiffs' admitted their homosexuality.· Subse-
quently, the Navy convened administrative discharge boards 
and discharged plaintiffs.' Plaintiffs received honorable military 
discharges, although their military files state they are unfit for 
military service and ineligible for reenlistment!' Plaintiffs chal-
lenged the discharge in the district court and, on appeal, as-
serted a fifth amendment denial of due process claim." The 
Ninth Circuit upheld the challenged regulations based on the 
special needs of the military.s 
1. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Kennedy, J; the other panel members were 
Browning, J. and Christensen, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3030, 
rehearing, rehearing en bane denied, 647 F.2d 80 (1981). 
2. The Naval Personnel Manual provides in relevant part: "Members may be recom· 
mended for discharge by reason of unfitness for: ... (e) Homosexual acts. Processing for 
discharge is mandatory .... " 632 F.2d at 803 n.ll (citing BUPKRSMAN 3420220). 
3. Beller is the consolidation of three cases: Beller v. Middendorf, Miller v. Rums· 
field and Saal v. Middendorf. Saal was stationed at Alameda Naval Air Station, and was 
discharged for having a homosexual affair with another enlisted penon stationed at Ala· 
meda Naval Air Station. 632 F.2d at 792·93. Miller was stationed at Alameda Naval Air 
Station aboard the USS Oriskany. He was discharged for engaging in homosexual acts 
with two Taiwanese nationals while stationed in Taiwan. ld. at 793·94. Beller was dis· 
charged after his homosexuality was discovered during an investigation conducted for 
the purpose of raising Beller's security clearance. ld. at 794·95. 
4. ld. at 793, 795. 
5. ld. at 806. 
6. ld. at 806·07. Two of the three plaintiffs have not tried to reenlist. The third, 
however, applied for and was denied reenlistment. ld. 
7. ld. at 807. 
8. ld. at 812. 
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The court first disposed of issues raised by the Navy con-
cerning lack of subject matter jurisdiction,' mootness,t° and fail-
ure to exhaust administrative remedies.l1 Having determined 
that plaintiffs claims were properly before the court, the Beller 
panel applied the procedural and substantive due process analy-
ses to determine whether the Navy regulation violated plaintiffs 
fifth amendment rights. 
Procedural due process requires the Navy not to deprive 
plaintiffs of a property or liberty interest without proper pro-
ceedings.I1 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' property interest 
claim13 which was based on the Naval policy that homosexual 
activity is cause for discharge. Plaintiffs' admissions that they 
engaged in homosexual acts extinguished any reasonable expec-
tations of continued employment they may have had.1• The 
court fdund the question of plaintiffs' loss of a liberty interest 
more difficult. 11 In resolving the issue, it was determinative that 
the plaintiffs admitted their homosexual acts, and that plaintiffs 
had the opportunity to introduce evidence to support their argu-
ments that the Secretary should exercise his discretion to retain 
9. The court found district court jurisdiction to hear the cases based on 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 (1976). 632 F.2d at 795. The Ninth Circuit also decided that the amount in contro· 
versy was not essential to the district court's jurisdiction since the suit was brought 
against an officer of the United States acting within his official capacity. [d. 
The Navy raised the issue of soveriegn immunity, but the court disposed of the issue 
under 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). Section 702 allows suits against the United States, provided 
that any resulting injunctive decree or order specifies the federal officer or officers per· 
sonally responsible for compliance. 632 F.2d at 796-97. 
10. The court dismissed the Navy's contention that the appeals were moot and 
pointed out that plaintiffs claims of stigmatization and potential employment difficulties 
are continuing damages, hence valid to litigate, despite the expiration of plaintiffs' en-
listment terms. 632 F.2d at SOO. 
11. To support this contention, the Navy cited Champagne v. Schlesinger, 506 F.2d 
979 (7th Cir. 1974), where the court required a person to appeal to the Board of Correc-
tion of Naval Records before contesting his denial of reenlistment in district court. [d. at 
984. The Beller court avoided dealing with this squarely by reasoning that Champagne 
dealt with reenlistment, while the instant case concerned discharges. 632 F.2d at 801. 
The court stated that the Ninth Circuit has not required total exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies before challenging regulations on constitutional grounds. [d. (citing Glines 
v. Wade, 586 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Brown v. Glines, 
440 U.S. 957 (1980)i Downen v. Warner, 418 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
12. 632 F.2d at 805. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
13. The property interest in question was wages. 
14. 632 F.2d at 805. 
15. [d. at 805-06. Apparently, a deprivation of liberty could be presumed if the 
Navy's charges were false, made public, and followed by discharge. [d. at 806. 
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them.I6 The court concluded the plaintiffs' liberty interests were 
protected by the hearings they received. 1'7 
Addressing the substantive due process issue, the court de-
clined to consider the plaintiffs' claim that homosexual conduct 
is protected as an aspect of the fundamental right of privacy.I8 
Since plaintiffs' claim was based on a deprivation of substantive 
due process, not on denial of equal protection,!" the Ninth Cir-
cuit scrutinized the regulation by employing a balancing test.IO 
The court relied on recent Supreme Court decisions involving 
substantive due process to support this approach.1I 
The Beller court's due process scrutiny of the regulation in-
volved a "balancing of the nature of the individual interests al-
legedly infringed, the importance of the government interests 
furthered, the degree of infringement, ,and the sensitivity of the 
government entity responsibile for the regulation to more care-
fully tailored alternative means of achieving its goals.''I1 The 
court compared the substantive due process analysis to the low-
est tier of equal protection scrutiny in cases where conduct not 
protected as a fundamental right is subject to government regu-
lations.18 In such cases, the court explained, "[a] rational rela-
tion to a legitimate government interest will normally suffice to 
uphold the regulation."lW However, where the government regu-
16. Jd. The court relied on the reasoning of Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977). 
17. Plaintiffs argued that they received the stigma of "unfitness" for retention with-
out a hearing on the issue. However, the court rejected this contention because 
[tlhe mere fact of discharge from a government position does: 
not deprive a person of a liberty interest. The real stigma im-
posed by the Navy's action, moreover, is the charge of homo-
sexuality, not the fact of discharge or some implied statement 
that the individual is not sufficiently needed to be retained. 
632 F.2d at 806 (citations omitted). 
18. The court conceded that if the right to engage in homosexual conduct is a fun-
damental right, such conduct would be "subjeCt to prohibition only to further compelling 
state interests and ... the ... burden imposed by the regulation must be a necesaary, 
or the least restrictive way to promote those interests." Jd. at 807. 
19.1d. 
20.1d. 
21. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
result)); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion), cited 
in Beller, 632 F.2d at 807. 
22. 632 F.2d at 807. 
23. Id. at 807-0B. 
24. Jd. at B08. 
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lation "seriously intrudes into matters which lie at the core of 
interests which deserve due process protection, then the compel-
ling state interest test employed in equal protection cases may 
be used by the Court to describe the appropriate due process 
analysis."11 The court concluded that this case lay somewhere 
between the two standards. Ie 
The panel acknowledged the substantial academic support 
for the argument that the choice to engage in homosexual action 
is a personal decision entitled to recognition as an aspect of an 
individual's fundamental right of privacy," but cited substantial 
authority to the contrary.lIB Although the court conceded that 
some kinds of government regulation of private consensual ho-
mosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional chal-
lenge,I8 it distinguished Beller on the ground that it involved 
military regulations prohibiting personnel from engaging in ho-
mosexual conduct while in the service." 
An . assessment of the military regulations was required be-
cause the military is " 'by necessity, a specialized society sepa-
rate from civilian society.' "11 The court concluded that the im-
portance of the government interests furthered by the 
regulations outweigh "whatever heightened solicitude is appro-
priate for consensual private homosexual conduct."11 The nature 
of the employer was "crucial" to its decision." The court ex-
plained that although one does not surrender constitutional 
rights upon entering the military, such rights must be viewed in 
light of the special circumstances and needs of the armed 
25.ld. 
26. Id. at 809. 
27. Id. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15·13 (1978); Comment, 
Out of the CICNIet, Out of a Job: Due Process in Teacher Disqualification, 6 HAsTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 663 (1979); Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homo· 
sexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613 (1974). 
28. 632 F.2d at 809·10. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 
(1976). 
29. 632 F.2d at 810. 
30. Id. The court contrasted cases involving military regulations with cases where 
the state, through its criminal process, coerces persons to comply with moral precepts 
even when they involve private acts of consenting adults. Id. 
31. Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)). 
32. 632 F.2d at 810. 
33.ld. 
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forces. a4 Therefore, regulations which might infringe upon con-
stitutional rights in other contexts may survive scrutiny because 
of military necessities.81 
Among the grounds cited by the court as support for the 
Navy regulation are: protecting the fabric of military life, pre-
serving the integrity of the recruiting process, maintaining disci-
pline of personnel in active service, and insuring the acceptance 
of military personnel abroad.ae In addition, the Navy "could 
conclude rationally that toleration of homosexual conduct . . . 
might be understood as tacit approval."" Finally, the court con-
cluded that although the rule might be broader than necessary 
to accomplish some of its goals, in view of the importance of the 
military's role, and the special need for discipline and order in 
the service, the regulation represented a reasonable effort to ac-
commodate the needs of the government as well as the interests 
of the individual. 
The opinion reflects unwarranted deference to the military. 
The panel's acceptance of the Navy's alleged interests in pre-
serving the integrity of the recruiting process, maintaining disci-
pline among active duty personnel, and insuring the acceptance 
of military personnel abroad, are particularly suspect. The busi-
ness of the Navy is to fight or be prepared to fight wars. The 
accomplishment of this mission does not entail the foisting of 
the Navy's views of morality on its members or the protection of 
the sensibilities of foreign nationals. Nor was the panel persua-
sive in arguing, not that public conduct might impinge on re-
cruitment, discipline, and public image, but that private, con-
sensual acts were so destructive as to warrant arbitrary and 
automatic discharge. 
The opinion is an inflexible acceptance of intolerance of the 
sort that could not withstand judicial scrutiny were it based on 
race or sex. Even if the Navy's interests were legitimate, it is 
difficult to see how they can survive either the strict scrutiny 
applicable to a fundamental right or the heightened scrutiny 
34. rd. 
35. rd. at 810-11. 
36. rd. at 811. 
37. rd. 
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used by the Beller panel.88 
B. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROSCRIBES FACIALLY INCON-
SISTENT VERDICTS FROM A BENCH TRIAL 
In United States v. Duz-Mor Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc.,8e 
the Ninth Circuit held that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment proscribes facially inconsistent verdicts from 
a bench trial in a criminal prosecution unless the trial court 
demonstrates by appropriate findings that the conviction validly 
rests on a rational basis. The trial judge convicted the defendant 
corporation of Medicare and Medi-Cal fraud. However, it dis-
missed the indictment of Irigene Morehead, president of the de-
fendant corporation, who, with her husband, owned all the 
shares of the corporation. On appeal, defendant challenged the 
constitutionality of the inconsistent verdicts when the only evi-
dence of culpability applied equally to both it and its 
president.40 
In resolving this issue, the Ninth Circuit first noted that the 
Second Circuit, in Rivera v. Harris,41 confronted a similar ques-
tion. In Rivera, three defendants faced criminal charges.4I At 
trial, the prosecution presented evidence that all three defen-
dants took part in the criminal acts. The defense called as its 
38. See order denying rehearing, 647 F.2d 80 (1981) (Norris and Boochever, J.J., 
dissenting). 
Judge Norris dissented from the court's rejection of the ~uggestion for rehearing en 
banco He argued that (1) the Beller panel seriously misconstrued the proper methodology 
of substantive due proce88 analysis; (2) the question of whether private consensual ho-
mosexual activity is protected as an aspect of the fundamental right of privacy, though 
"avoided" by the Beller panel, is "crucial" to the proper due process analysis; and (3) the 
Navy's justification for the regulation are so "wholly inadequate" that the regulation is 
unconstitutional. Id. at 80-88. 
Judge Boochever concurred in part with the Norris di88ent. He stated: "Assuming 
that the Navy's profeBBed interests are legitimate they cannot survive either the strict 
scrutiny test applicable to fundamental rights or the "heightened solicitude" test used by 
the Beller panel. [d. at SO. 
39. 650 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were 
Schroeder, J. and East, D.J., sitting by designation). 
40. Evidence implicating defendant and Morehead included a tape· recorded conver-
sation between an undercover agent and Morehead concerning an allegedly illegal kick-
back agreement. The trial judge heard the tapes before granting Morehead's motion to 
dismiss and denying an identical motion by defendant corporation. [d. at 225. 
41. 643 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1981). 
42. The three defendants faced five charges each. The trial judge acquitted all three 
defendants on two of those charges. Id. at 89. The remaining three led to the constitu-
tional challenge. 
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only witness one defendant who testified that all three defen-
dants were innocent.48 The trial judge, hearing the case without 
a jury, convicted two of the three defendants and acquitted the 
third. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the decision 
based on the fact that the facially inconsistent verdicts consti-
tuted a prima facie case of denial of due process.44 
The Ninth Circuit noted that other circuits are split over 
the issue of inconsistent verdicts from bench trials.40 The court, 
however, found the question open within this circuit and 
adopted the Rivera approach.4' 
C. PRIOR ALCOHOLISM: No AUTOMATIC BAR TO FAA FLIGHT 
QUALIFICATION 
In Jensen v. Administrator of Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration,47 the Ninth Circuit invalidated Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) regulations48 which disqualified all persons with 
a history of alcoholism from obtaining medical certificates re-
quired for a commercial pilot's license.41 
Jensen, who holds a lifetime commercial pilot certificate, 
43. [d. at 88-89. 
44. Id. at 98. 
45. 650 F.2d at 225-26. The court distinguished Duz-Mor from two earlier Ninth 
Circuit cases which affirmed inconsistent verdicts. McElheny v. United States, 146 F.2d 
932 (9th Cir. 1944), involved inconsistencies between multiple counts of an indictment as 
opposed to that between verdicts of multiple defendants. In United States v. Zamora-
Corona, 465 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1972), the court never reached the iaeue of inconsistent 
verdicts because it concluded that the verdicts were not neceaearily inconsistent. 
The Duz-Mor court also noted that in United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 553 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977), the Eighth Circuit sustained inconsistent verdicts 
on multiple counts of an indictment. 
46. 650 F.2d at 226-27. The court permits inconsistent verdicts in jury trials because 
individual jurors may disagree in aesessing evidence and courts dislike invading the ju-
rors decision-making province. [d. at 226. In bench trials, however, neither factor comes 
into play and the judge must rule consistently. [d. 
The Duz-Mor court also noted that this case involved a dismil88l whereas in Rivera 
there was an acquittal. However, to distinguish the two cases on that basis would "make 
this case turn upon the formal point that inconsistent substance can be overlooked when 
erroneous form was employed." [d. at 227 n.4. Consequently, the court extended the 
Rivera approach to dismissals. 
47. 641 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Solomon, D.J., sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Fletcher, J. and Trask, J., dissenting). 
48. 14 C.F.R. §§ 67.15, 67.17 (1980). 
49. FAA regulations require commercial pilots to have both an FAA commercial pi-
lot certificate and a second-class medical certificate. 641 F.2d at 798. 
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applied to the FAA for recertification of his second-class medical 
certificate. He disclosed his history of alcoholism, but asserted 
he was fully cured. The FAA denied his application without a 
hearing under FAA regulations which automatically disqualify 
all prior alcoholics from obtaining medical certificates. The de-
nial was affirmed by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB).IIO 
The majority applied provisions of the Comprehensive Alco-
hol Abuse and Alcohol Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1970 (the Alcoholism Act),lIl which prohibits the de-
nial of jobs and privileges to reformed alcoholics solely because 
of their history of alcoholism. III The FAA argued that certificates 
were not denied solely on the grounds of prior alcoholism since 
the FAA administration had discretion to grant an exemption 
from the rule if it would be "in the public interest" and "would 
not adversely affect safety."IIS The majority rejected this conten-
tion, finding that exemption from the rule, at the Administra-
tor's discretion, could not cure the direct conflict between the 
disqualifying regulations and the Alcoholism Act.a. In addition, 
the exemption procedures did not comport with due process.1III 
The Jensen court concluded that, although the challenged dis-
qualifying regulations were held valid, the FAA may still con-
sider alcoholism a problem in its certification process, albeit on a 
case-by-case basis." 
50.ld. 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 4561(c)(1) (1976). This section provides in part: "No person may be 
denied or deprived of Federal civilian or other employment or a Federal professional or 
other license or right solely on the grounds of prior alcohol abuse or prior alcoholism." 
52. 641 F.2d at 798. 
53. Id. at 799. The FAA based its argument on 14 C.F.R. § 1l.27(e) (1980) which 
provides that "[i]f the Administrator determines, after consideration of any comments 
received in response to a summary of a petition for exemption, that the petition is in the 
public interest, the Administrator [may grant] the exemption." 
54. 641 F.2d at 799. 
55. In reaching this conclusion, the majority found it determinative that the FAA 
need not grant an applicant a hearing before passing on the application, and that the 
decisions were reviewable under the "arbitrary and capricious standard." Id. See Keating 
v. FAA, 610 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1979). In addition, the court explained that due process 
requires, for a meaningful review of an agency decision, that the agency must have ar-
ticulated standards governing its determinations. In the instant case, the FAA standard 
did not give the court sufficient basis for review. 641 F.2d at 799. 
56. 641 F.2d at 799. Inquiries into the effect of prior alcoholism under 14 C.F.R. § 
67.15(d)(ii) (1980) would comply with the Alcoholism Act, according to the court, be-
cause jobs and privileges will not be denied to reformed alcoholics solely because of their 
history of Alcoholism. 14 C.F.R. § 67.15(d)(ii) (1980) provides that an applicant must 
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establish that he has: 
[nJo other personality disorder. neurosis. or mental condition 
that the Federal Air Surgeon finds-
(a) Makes the applicant unable to safely perform the 
duties or exercise the privileges of the airman certificate 
that he holds or for which he is applying ... and the 
findings are based on the case history and appropriate. 
qualified. medical judgment relating to the condition 
involved. 
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